关键词: 公路货运平台, 物流赔付, 时效性, 双边市场, 定价

Abstract: Considering the compensation rate from the platform, transportation delay risk from drivers and the attention of timeliness from the consigners, this paper studies two kinds of decisions about two delay compensation pricing strategies, and tries to obtain the optimal equilibrium depending on the reverse solution method. The results show that: (1)When the network externality of the drivers is more than twice that of the consigners, the platform should choose strategy C; conversely, when the delay risk of drivers is lower than a certain threshold and the attention of timeliness from the consigners is higher than a certain threshold, strategy F should be chosen, otherwise, strategy C should be chosen. (2)Platform revenue will increase both for strategy F and C with the reduction of delay risk of drivers and improvement of the attention of timeliness from the consigners, which will not be affected by the compensation rate. (3)If strategy F is selected, the consigners will not be subsidized. When strategy C is selected, if the network externality of the drivers is more than that of the consigners, subsidy will be implemented. if not, only when the drivers's delay risk is lower than a certain threshold value and the attention of timeliness from the consigners is higher than a certain threshold, the subsidy could be implemented. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify.

Key words: highway freight platform, logistics compensation, timeliness, bilateral market, pricing