关键词: 供应链, 交叉持股, 均衡定价, 市场绩效, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: In order to strengthen strategic cooperation, cross-shareholding among firms in supply chain has become popular. How does cross-shareholding affect operating decisions and performance of supply chain firms? Can cross-shareholding improve the efficiency of supply chain operation and achieve a win-win between the chain's firms and consumers? These have always been hot issues people pay attention to. Although there have been a lot of literature on cross-shareholding between firms in two-tier supply chain, the research on cross-shareholding among firms in three-tier supply chain is very rare. This paper firstly establishes the profit formulation of cross-shareholding among firms by using the mechanism of feedback control. On this basis, conducting Stackelberg pricing game model of firms in three-tier supply chain with cross-shareholding, and carrying out elaborate and tedious mathematical deduction by backward induction, the equilibrium price and profit formula of each firm in the supply chain are derived. The influence of cross-shareholding level on equilibrium market price, firms' profits, consumer surplus and economic welfare is analyzed. The results show that, compared with non-cross-shareholding, only downstream firms' one-way shareholding in upstream firms has no effect on the supply chain performance. Properly increasing upstream firms' shareholding in downstream firms, while restricting downstream firms' shareholding in upstream firms, can effectively lower market price, increase the chain's total profit and all firms' profits, raise consumer surplus, and improve economic welfare, so as to realize a win-win situation between firms in the supply chain and consumers.

Key words: supply chain, cross-shareholding, equilibrium pricing, market performance, Stackelberg game