关键词: 生鲜农产品供应链, 合作偏好, 随机产出, 政府补贴机制

Abstract: Under the background that the retailer has cooperative preference behavior, based on the characteristics of natural disasters affecting output, different government subsidy policies based on “promoting the farmer's income increase on the basis of giving priority to maximizing social welfare” are designed, and a three-stage Stackelberg game model composed of a government, a retailer and farmers is established. This paper compares and analyzes the effects of different government subsidy policies and the retailer's cooperative preference behavior on the optimal subsidy rate of the government, the optimal purchase price of the retailer, the optimal production input of farmers and the interests of the three parties, and gives the optimal subsidy policy of the government. The results show that: (1)when the cooperative preference degree of the retailer is lower than a certain critical value, and the probability of “harvest year” is moderate or high, the government's optimal subsidy policy is to provide subsidies to farmers, otherwise, the government's optimal subsidy policy is to provide subsidies to the retailer; (2)the government's optimal subsidy policy can achieve a tripartite win-win situation among the government, consumers and the members without subsidies, but do not necessarily promote the incomes of the subsidized members.

Key words: fresh agricultural product supply chain, cooperative preference, random yield, government subsidy mechanism