关键词: 权力结构, 预售, 双渠道供应链, 渠道替代程度

Abstract: Given that the manufacturer distributes products through a wholly-owned direct channel and an independent traditional channel in advance and regular selling stages, we investigate the optimal strategies under different power structures in a dual-channel supply chain. Based on the relationship of the manufacturer and its retailer, we establish manufacturer-dominated Stackelberg, manufacturer-retailer Vertical Nash, and retailer-dominated Stackelberg game models respectively. Then, we compare the optimal strategies, analyze the sensitivity of key factors, and verify the robustness of game models. Finally, we find that the channel substitutability degree and marginal production cost are key factors that affect the optimal strategies and performances of supply chain members. As the channel substitutability degree increases, the market demand in advance selling turns to that in regular selling. The reason is the customers become more sensitive to the prices, which increase with the channel substitutability degree.

Key words: power structure, advance selling, dual-channel supply chain, channel substitutability degree