高管个人特征对股权激励模式选择的影响研究

doi:10.12005/orms.2019.0263

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 上市公司股权激励模式的选择问题一直受社会各界关注。本文利用2006年到2017年期间实施股权激励的上市公司数据,研究了高管个人特征如何对股权激励模式的选择产生影响。结果表明,被激励高管的个人特征如高管年龄、任期、学历与社会资本显著影响公司股权激励模式的选择,年龄越大、任期越久、学历越高、社会资本越丰富的高管,公司更倾向选择限制性股票激励模式;男性高管越多的公司,越倾向选择股票期权激励模式,然而性别对其影响并不显著。本文在经过一系列的稳健性和内生性检验后,研究结论依然成立。本文研究结果丰富了股权激励相关理论,并为上市公司科学合理地选择股权激励模式提供参考。

关键词: 股权激励模式, 股票期权, 限制性股票, 高管个人特征

Abstract: The choice of the equity incentive mode of listed companies has always been concerned by the community. This paper uses the data of listed companies that implement equity incentives from 2006 to 2017 to study how the individual characteristics of executives affect the choice of equity incentive mode. The results show that individual characteristics of executives such as executives’ age, tenure, education and social capital significantly affect the choice of the equity incentive mode. If the executive’s age is older, tenure is longer, education is higher, and social capital is more abundant, the company is more likely to grant the restricted stock to them. If proportion of male executives is larger, the company is more likely to select the stock option, but the effect of gender is not significant. The conclusions are still valid after a series of robustness and endogenous tests. The conclusion of this study enriches the theory of equity incentives, and provides reference for the listed companies to select equity incentive mode scientifically and rationally.

Key words: equity incentive mode, stock option, restricted stock, individual characteristics of executives

中图分类号:

F272

李苗, 扈文秀, 张建锋. 高管个人特征对股权激励模式选择的影响研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2019, 28(11): 169-177.

LI Miao, HU Wen-xiu, ZHANG Jian-feng. Impact of Individual Characteristics of Executives on the Choice of the Equity Incentive Mode[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2019, 28(11): 169-177.

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