Negotiation Model for “Company+Farmer”Contract Farming SupplyChain Under Random Yield Environment

doi:10.12005/orms.2017.0165

Abstract

Abstract: The coordination for contract farming supply chain consisting of a risk-averse farmer and a risk-neutral agribusiness firm is investigated in this paper. We develop a model that incorporates the yield uncertainty and yield-dependent retail price of agricultural products. The farmer’s production quantity and the firm’s wholesale price decisions are determined based on Nash negotiation model. The analysis suggests that there exist equilibrium solutions for the Nash negotiation model under yield uncertainty and yield-dependent retail price environment. The optimal production quantity and wholesale price under Nash negotiation model will be higher than that of the decentralized model. The optimal production quantity increases in the farmer’s risk aversion, while the wholesale price decreases in the farmer’s risk aversion. In addition, the Nash negotiation model can help to achieve the Pareto improvement for both the risk-averse farmer and the risk-neutral agribusiness firm.

Key words: conditional value-at-risk(CVaR), random yield, nash negotiation model, contract-farming supply chain

摘要： 在农产品产出不确定性及零售价格受农产品产出率影响的条件下,研究了一类由风险规避农户和风险中性公司组成“公司+农户”型订单农业农产品供应链协调问题。在该农产品供应链中,农户和公司通过Nash协商谈判来分别决策最优的生产量和订单价格。研究结果表明,在农产品产出不确定及零售市场价格受农产品产出率影响的条件下,风险规避型农户和公司的Nash协商合作博弈存在均衡解。Nash协商谈判所达成的最优农产品产出量和订单价格均高于分散决策情形下的最优农产品产出量和订单价格。最优农产品产出量是关于农户风险规避度的单调增函数,而最优的订单价格是关于农户风险规避度的单调减函数。最后,通过与分散决策情形相比,证明了Nash协商谈判机制能够促使风险规避型农户和风险中性型公司均达到帕累托改进。

关键词: CVaR, 随机产出, Nash协商模型, 订单农业供应链

CLC Number:

F224.3

YE Fei, WANG Ji-pu. Negotiation Model for “Company+Farmer”Contract Farming SupplyChain Under Random Yield Environment[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(7): 82-91.

叶飞, 王吉璞. 产出不确定条件下“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链协商模型研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(7): 82-91.

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