Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2019, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (9): 75-84.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2019.0201

• Theory Analysis and Methodology Study • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Business and E-commerce Platform in Two-sided Market

LI Sen-biao1, XING Wen-jie2   

  1. 1. School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China;
    2. School of Management, Guizhou University, Guiyang 500025, China
  • Received:2018-02-02 Online:2019-09-25

双边市场下商家和电子商务平台的演化博弈分析

李森彪1, 邢文杰2   

  1. 1.中国人民大学 商学院,北京 100872;
    2.贵州大学 管理学院,贵州 贵阳 500025
  • 作者简介:李森彪(1990-),男,河南驻马店人,博士研究生,研究方向:创新管理,电子商务;邢文杰(1972-),男,山东烟台人,副教授,博士,研究方向:企业创新,电子商务。
  • 基金资助:
    国家软科学资助项目(2010GXS5D258);贵州省研究生教育教学改革重点课题(JGKT2017010);中国人民大学2018年度拔尖创新人才培育资助计划成果

Abstract: The phenomena of “Two Choices One” and “Many Choices One” in the Internet economy havearoused widespread concern in many sectors of society at home and abroad. Under the above real context, this paper sets up some related parameters and variables hypothesis based on actual conditions, and establishes an evolutionary game model of business and e-commerce platform involving exclusive competition in two-sided market. The evolutionary equilibrium strategies of business and e-commerce platform under different conditions are obtained, and we also analyze the influence of parameter variation on evolutionary equilibrium strategy. Finally, the numerical experiment verifies equilibrium results of system evolution. The research results have practical significance for managers’ decision-making of businesses and e-commerce platforms, as well as the effective supervision of government departments on unfair competition.

Key words: e-commerce platform, business, exclusive strategy, evolutionary game

摘要: 互联网平台经济中存在的“二选一”和“多选一”现象引起了国内外社会各界的广泛关注,在此现实情境下,本文作了具体参数设置和相应假设,构建了双边市场下商家和电子商务平台关于排他性竞争行为的演化博弈模型,得到商家和电子商务平台在不同条件下的演化稳定均衡策略,并讨论了参数变化对演化稳定均衡策略的影响。最后,通过数值算例分析对系统演化稳定均衡结果进行了验证。研究结果对商家和电子商务平台企业的管理决策,以及政府监管部门对互联网经济下不正当竞争行为的有效监管有着一定启示意义。

关键词: 电子商务平台, 商家, 排他性策略, 演化博弈

CLC Number: