Abstract: Considering the contractual incompleteness in a vertical R&D cooperation, we analyze the marketer’s hold-up behavior, and establish an investment-incentive model based on the hold-up-proofness milestone contract, then we obtain the researcher’s investment decision and the marketer’scontract design under different information structure. The result shows when the innovation’s type is public information, the contract satisfying all the constraints is achievable with a payment term that the up-front payment is zero and the milestone payment is equal to the value when it leaks the innovation to the outside party; when the informationis? symmetric, the marketer offers a screening contract with the mutual balance of two type innovations’ up-front payment and milestone payment. Through the analysis and comparison, it is found that the investment level is higher when the information is asymmetric, and the information superiority’s function of investment incentive decreaseswith innovation’s relationship-specificity and the probability of innovation with a high quality, but it is increasing with the ratio of low type innovation’s quality to high type innovation’s quality.

Key words: vertical R&D partnership, milestone payment, hold-up problem, information asymmetry

摘要： 考虑纵向研发合作中合同的不完全性,分析了里程碑支付合同中开发单位的敲竹杠行为,建立了防敲竹杠问题的投资激励模型,给出了不同信息结构下研究单位的投资决策和开发单位的合同设计。研究结果表明:均衡解存在的情况下,信息对称时,研究单位获得的预付款和里程碑支付分别为零和其外部选择收益;信息不对称时,开发单位为研究单位提供了一个高低两种质量类型下预付款和里程碑支付相互平衡的信息甄别合同。比较分析发现:信息不对称时研究单位的投资水平更高,且研究单位拥有信息优势时的投资激励作用随着创新的关系专用性程度和高质量创新出现的概率递减,但随着两种类型创新的质量的比值递增。

关键词: 纵向研发合作, 里程碑支付, 敲竹杠问题, 信息不对称