Abstract: Presently, new energy time-sharing rental vehicles are in an early stage of development in China, and problems like ineffective operation, security issues and subsidies cheating arise one after another, which have caused great trouble to consumers and the government. In this paper, a three-way dynamic game model among government, enterprises and consumers is constructed and solved based on the evolutionary game theory. The model results are numerically simulated by Python software. Theresearch shows that there are four evolutionary stability results when the key parameters are set in different numerical ranges. Therefore, appropriately increasing the amount of subsidy and punishment, increasing the proportion of compensation coefficient received by consumers, and urging enterprises to reduce operating costs are conducive to the healthy development of the new energy vehicle rental market.The conclusions of the research can work as a theoretical basis and reference for government sectors to make and implement a policy.

Key words: new energy, time-sharing, evolutionary game, supervision

摘要： 目前我国新能源分时租赁汽车正处于发展初期,其发展过程中存在的问题接踵而至,如运营不力、安全隐患以及骗取补贴金等,对消费者和政府造成了较大的困扰。本文运用演化博弈理论构建了政府部门、企业与消费者之间的三方动态博弈模型,基于复制动态方程和雅可比矩阵对模型进行求解分析,并通过Python软件对模型结果进行数值仿真模拟。研究表明,当关键参数取值位于不同数值区间时,系统分别呈现出四种演化稳定结果。适当加大补贴额度与惩罚力度、增加消费者得到的补偿系数比例、敦促企业降低努力经营成本,有利于新能源分时租赁汽车行业的健康发展。研究结论为政府部门政策制定及决策实施提供理论依据与参考。

关键词: 新能源, 分时租赁, 演化博弈, 监管