Abstract: Since January 1, 2018, the environmental tax has been implemented, and the fixed governing framework has been formed, i.e. carbon trade, environmental tax and carbon subsidy. Three-stage dynamic game models are constructed based on maximum welfare and equilibrium strategies are analyzed with hybrid governing strategies. The results show that: firstly, from the perspective of policies' effect, carbon trade, environmental tax and carbon subsidy can encourage the enterprises to make emission reduction. However, carbon trade and environmental tax have additive effects to decrease products activities. Secondly, from the perspective of carbon reduction innovation, this paper achieves different results. The technology spillover rate has the most important influence. When it is larger than the threshold value, the imperfect cooperation is the best. But the imperfect cooperation is not better than the competitive mode. Hence, carbon price, environmental tax rate, subsidy rate and technology spillover rate are the key factors when the enterprises make decisions about production and emission reduction. The government should pay more attention to the connected effect between product market and emission reduction markets.

Key words: environmental policy, corporate behavior, emission reduction investment, game model

摘要： 2018年1月1日实施环境保护税法以后,我国正式开始了碳排放权交易、环境税、碳减排补贴政策的混合环境规制框架。本文基于政府社会福利最大化目标,构建了三阶段动态博弈模型,讨论各种政策相互作用下的均衡策略选择。研究结论显示:一是从政策作用效果来看,碳排放权交易、环境税、碳减排补贴政策能够激励企业进行减排技术创新投资决策。但是碳排放权交易和环境税却对企业生产决策起到叠加作用,抑制产品市场的活跃程度。二是从企业合作创新模式来看,本文得出不同的研究结论,即技术溢出系数大于临界阈值时,完全合作创新模式是企业最优选择,并实现了企业最优减排水平;否则完全合作创新模式并不优于不合作创新模式。说明碳排放权交易价格、环境税率、减排补贴率的合理制定,以及合作创新的技术溢出率大小将影响减排企业在产品市场和技术研发市场的最优决策,我国政府需要重视产品市场和技术研发市场的联动效用来制定环境规制政策。

关键词: 环境政策, 企业行为, 减排投资, 博弈模型