Research on Local Government Environmental Governance Behavior Under the Background of Central Environmental Inspection

doi:10.12005/orms.2021.0324

Operations Research and Management Science ›› 2021, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (10): 127-133.DOI: 10.12005/orms.2021.0324

• Theory Analysis and Methodology Study • Previous Articles Next Articles

Research on Local Government Environmental Governance Behavior Under the Background of Central Environmental Inspection

KOU po¹, HAN Ying¹, SHI Jun-guo²

1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169, China;
2. School of Finance and Economics, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China

Received:2019-12-30 Online:2021-10-25

中央环保督察背景下地方政府环境管制行为研究

寇坡¹, 韩颖¹, 石俊国²

1.东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳 110169;
2.江苏大学财经学院,江苏镇江 212013

作者简介:寇坡(1991-),男,河南南阳人,博士研究生,研究方向:环境及资源经济数量分析;韩颖(1961-),女,吉林长春人,教授,博士,研究方向:数量经济方法及应用、环境及资源经济数量分析;石俊国(1987-),男,山东滨州人,副教授,博士,研究方向:产业组织理论,创新经济学。
基金资助:
教育部社科基金一般规划项目,能源消费回弹效应的城乡异质、空间溢出与演变特征研究(18YJA790031);国家社会科学基金重大项目,建立能源和水资源消耗、建设用地总量和强度双控市场化机制研究(15ZDC034);辽宁省自然科学基金,辽宁省装备制造业能源回弹机理及抑制机制基础研究(201602267)

Abstract

Abstract: The improvement effect of the central environmental inspection has been affirmed, but the sustainability of the improvement effect has been questioned. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a dynamic replication system for local governments and pollution enterprises to explore the ways to improve environmental quality under the pressure of central environmental inspection. The results show that: in the process of central environmental inspection, the improvement of environmental quality may come from the indiscriminate shutdown of polluting enterprises; if the central government blindly increases the punishment for the local government, the local government may adopt a “one size fits all strategy”; the initial pollution and control cost in the jurisdiction affect the behavior choice of the local government. The local government's “one size fits all rectification” is the result of many factors, so the central government should coordinate all forces, make rational decisions, and promote the benign progress of central environmental supervision.

Key words: central environmental protection inspector, local government, polluting enterprises, one size fits all

摘要： 中央环保督察对环境的改善效果备受肯定,但是这种改善效果的持续性却受到质疑。基于演化博弈理论,本文构建了地方政府和污染企业的动态复制系统,探究中央环保督察压力下空气质量改善的途径。研究结果表明:中央环保督察过程中,空气质量的改善可能来自于地方政府无差别的关停污染企业;中央政府一味地加大对地方政府环保失职的惩罚,可能会导致地方政府采取一刀切式的“懒政”、“怠政”行为;辖区的初始污染水平、管制成本均影响地方政府的行为选择。地方政府一刀切行为是多因素驱动的结果,中央政府应协调各方力量,理性决策,推动中央环保督察的良性运行。

关键词: 中央环保督察, 地方政府, 污染企业, 一刀切

CLC Number:

F224.32
X323

KOU po, HAN Ying, SHI Jun-guo. Research on Local Government Environmental Governance Behavior Under the Background of Central Environmental Inspection[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(10): 127-133.

寇坡, 韩颖, 石俊国. 中央环保督察背景下地方政府环境管制行为研究[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(10): 127-133.

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Research on Local Government Environmental Governance Behavior Under the Background of Central Environmental Inspection

中央环保督察背景下地方政府环境管制行为研究

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