Fiscal Subsidy Policy and Long-Term Care Insurance Market Evolution

doi:10.12005/orms.2021.0331

Abstract

Abstract: Financial subsidy policy is an important method for the government to correct market failure and drive the long-term care insurance (LTCI) market to be effective. Based on the multi-agent simulation model, this paper investigates the evolution process of LTCI market driven by different subsidy policies. It is found that when implementing the operating subsidy policy, the LTCI market is easy to evolve into a monopoly market; but implementing the product innovation subsidy policy can form a healthy and orderly market competition. The premium subsidy policy can expand the scale of demand, and the differentiated premium subsidy policy can effectively stimulate the substantial growth of demand space.

Key words: fiscal subsidy, long-term care insurance, innovation subsidy, operating subsidy, premium subsidy, evolution

摘要： 财政补贴政策是政府矫正市场失灵,驱动长期护理保险市场高质量演化发展的重要手段。本文基于多主体仿真模型,考察不同补贴政策驱动长期护理保险市场演化的过程。研究发现:实行产品创新补贴政策时,可以形成健康有序的长期护理保险市场竞争格局;实行经营性补贴政策时,长期护理保险市场容易演化成垄断市场。保费补贴政策能够扩大需求规模,且差异化的保费补贴政策能够更加有效地激励需求空间的大幅增长。

关键词: 财政补贴, 长期护理保险, 创新补贴, 经营性补贴, 保费补贴, 演化

CLC Number:

F812.2

CHEN Kai, ZHAO Na, JIAO Yang. Fiscal Subsidy Policy and Long-Term Care Insurance Market Evolution[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(10): 169-174.

陈凯, 赵娜, 焦阳. 财政补贴政策与长期护理保险市场演化[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(10): 169-174.

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