Abstract: To find out the evolutionary game rule of air traffic controllers' violation and supervision strategy under team norms, the evolutionary game model between controllers and safety supervision department is constructed from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. The local stability of equilibrium point of game system is analyzed. The system dynamics model of evolutionary game is established to simulate the dynamic evolution process of game strategy selection under different conditions, and the influence of model parameters on the system evolution results is analyzed. The results show that positive team norms can help the system evolve to an ideal mode, while negative team norms can make the system fall into a “bad lock” mode and “oscillation” mode. The system evolution results are influenced by the benefits of controllers' behavior, the cost of controllers' behavior, the probability of being detected, the intensity of punishment and the cost of supervision. The long-term supervision of controllers' violation can be started with encouraging the team members to carry out negative evaluation of violation and strengthening the punishment of controllers.

Key words: team norms, air traffic controller, violation, supervision, evolutionary game

摘要： 为发现团队规范下管制员违章行为及监管策略的演化博弈规律,运用演化博弈理论,构建安全管理者与管制员演化博弈模型,分析博弈系统均衡点的局部稳定性。在此基础上建立演化博弈的系统动力学模型,仿真模拟不同情形下博弈双方策略选择的动态演化过程,并分析模型参数变化对系统演化结果的影响。结果表明:正的团队规范有助于系统演化至理想模式,负的团队规范会使系统陷入“不良锁定”模式和“震荡”模式;管制员行为收益、行为成本、被监查到的概率、处罚力度、监管成本等因素均对系统演化结果产生影响。鼓励班组成员对违章行为进行否定性评价、加大对管制员的处罚力度等均能够长效促进管制员主动遵章。

关键词: 团队规范, 管制员, 违章行为, 监管, 演化博弈