Abstract: Equity-based compensations lead to CEO’s myopia and risk-taking behavior and “inside debt” is an effective program to solve this problem. Although contingent compensation has been introduced to solve these problems, how to design effective contingent compensation lacks the corresponding theoretical support. For this reason, this paper utilizes the theory of corporate finance and the method of financial engineering to design the contingent compensation. We show that the designed contingent compensation can overcome the shortcomings of the equity-based compensations. Using dynamic programming method, we derive explicit values of all the securities. Developing principal-agent model, we get a sufficient condition of incentive compatibility. We provide numerical analysis of the contingent compensation. The analysis shows that risk-taking behavior of CEO can be mitigated by introducing the contingent compensation. CEO will be more concerned about the general welfare of the community, and the long-term developmentofcorporate.

Key words: equity compensation, contingent compensation, risk-taking

摘要： 股权类薪酬可导致高管冒险决策,而“内部债”是解决这个问题的可行方案。或有薪酬作为一种新型的“内部债”模式得到了实务界的重视,但如何设计或有薪酬以缓解股权激励下的高管冒险决策尚无理论研究。本文利用动态规划方法,得到高管薪酬价值及企业证券价值的显式解;构建委托代理模型,给出薪酬合同激励相容的一个充分条件;并给出了最优合同的数值结果及定量分析。分析表明:与单纯的股权薪酬相比,或有薪酬有效缓解了高管的冒险决策,促使其顾及社会总福利、注重企业长期发展。

关键词: 股权薪酬, 或有薪酬, 冒险决策