Abstract: For the rent-seeking problem of “carbon verification” business rights, we consider the supervision and influence of the government, emission control companies, and third-party verification companies. An evolutionary game model is established to explore the evolutionary equilibrium of the governance of “carbon verification” business rights rent-seeking behavior in different situations strategies. The results show that the rent-seeking behavior of carbon verification business rights is affected by the different decision-making behaviors of various entities. How to restrain and control the behavior of enterprises is the key to solving the problem of “carbon verification” business rights rent-seeking. The recheck and random inspection rate cannot effectively restrict the rent-seeking behavior of the emission control companies, while the high re-check random inspection rate can effectively restrict the rent-seeking behavior of the emission control companies. Due to the different rent-seeking costs, the sensitivity of the emission control enterprises, and the third-party verification enterprises to the government's punishment is different. Medium and high-intensity review rates and punishment intensity are helpful to reduce the possibility of power rent-seeking by emission control enterprises and third-party verification enterprises.

Key words: carbon verification, multi-party game, right rent-seeking, regulatory control

摘要： 针对“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题,考虑政府、控排企业及第三方核查企业对其治理的影响,运用演化博弈理论分析各参与主体在“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题治理过程中的决策行为。研究结果表明:碳核查”业务权利寻租行为的发生受各主体不同决策行为的共同作用,如何约束控排企业的行为是解决“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题的关键;中低强度的复查抽检率无法有效约束控排企业的寻租行为,而高复查抽检率则可有效约束控排企业的寻租行为;因寻租成本不同,控排企业及第三方核查企业对政府惩罚力度的敏感性不同;中高强度的复查率及惩罚力度,有助于降低控排企业及第三方核查企业权力寻租行为的发生。

关键词: 碳核查, 多方博弈, 权利寻租, 监管控制