Abstract: The rapid advancements in new-generation digital technologies such as blockchain, big data, and artificial intelligence have led to a paradigm shift from the traditional linear supply chain to the digitized supply chain. This transformation has prompted a reorganization of conventional supply chain structures, modes of operation, and individualization. The incorporation of digital technologies can enhance the competitiveness of enterprise supply chains and facilitate the transformation and upgrading of supply chains. Digitization has become the prevailing industry consensus for the future development direction of supply chain management. However, recent findings from Accenture’s “China Enterprise Digital Transformation Index” report reveal that the majority of Chinese manufacturing enterprises are still in the initial stage of their digitalization journey. In order to achieve digital transformation and upgrading of the manufacturing industry, the active collaboration of supply chain node enterprises is requisite. However, the application and utilization of digital technology can significantly influence the operational decisions and actions of enterprises, thereby affecting the development trajectory of China’s manufacturing supply chain. The successful integration of digitalization and industrial and supply chains necessitates comprehensive theoretical investigation. During supply chain digitalization, there can exist spillover effects between suppliers and manufacturers when investing in technologies such as blockchain and big data, potentially hampering the willingness of supply chain enterprises to digitize and impacting the digital acceleration of manufacturing supply chains. From this point of view, an evolutionary game model is constructed based on the digital decision-making of supply chain enterprises. The evolutionary stability strategy of the model is analyzed through the application of evolutionary game theory. The determinants of digital decision-making of supply chain enterprises under different scenarios are examined, and the digital decision-making thresholds and policies of supply chain enterprises under the government’s incentives and penalties mechanism are explored. Lastly, the simulation analysis evaluates the impact of diverse incentives and penalties on the evolutionary outcomes and trends. The results show that the choice of digital investment strategy among suppliers and manufacturers is influenced by investment returns, resulting in seven scenarios where an evolutionary stable strategy exists. Among them, scenarios 2 and 6, as well as scenarios 3 and 5, share the same evolutionary stable strategy. Government incentives and penalties can effectively encourage supply chain companies to choose digital investments. Numerical examples show that under the conditions of satisfying the threshold of government subsidy or penalty policies, diverse incentives and sanctions, as well as initial investment probabilities, have a significant impact on the decision-making strategies of enterprises regarding investment in the digitalization of supply chains. The high cost of digital investment is the fundamental reason inhibiting the digital development of supply chain enterprises, and most Chinese enterprises are still in the early exploration stage of supply chain digitalization. In a follow-up study, we will address the challenges of high investment costs for supply chain digitalization and digital decision-making by discussing the specific fiscal and tax policies implemented by the government regarding supply chain digital decision-making. Additionally, we will establish a development stage model to evaluate the maturity level of supply chain digitalization, aiding supply chain node enterprises in identifying their current digitalization stage, so that the result of our research would more practical.

Key words: supply chain, digital decision-making, evolutionary game, reward and punishment

摘要： 考察数字经济环境下供应链数字化行为决策,分析政府在制造业供应链数字化行为决策中的作用机制,是促进供应链数字化发展的有效手段。本文建立供应链企业数字化决策的演化博弈数量模型,分析在不同情况下供应链企业进行数字化决策的稳定策略及成因,并且讨论了政府对供应链企业数字化决策实施奖惩机制的政策阈值,最后进行数值仿真分析不同奖惩机制对演化结果及其演化趋势的影响。结果表明,政府实施差异化的奖惩对推动供应链企业数字化投资决策具有积极作用,在满足大于政府补贴或惩罚政策阈值下,补贴或惩罚的力度越大,供应链企业选择投资数字化策略的概率收敛速度越快,即不同政府奖惩力度、不同的博弈方投资初始概率对企业选择投资供应链数字化决策策略有显著影响。

关键词: 供应链, 数字化决策, 演化博弈, 奖惩机制