Abstract: The establishment of a government guide fund is a strategic measure taken by the Chinese government to encourage and guide social capital to invest in technology-based small and medium-sized enterprises, promote technological innovation and entrepreneurship, and accelerate the cultivation of strategic emerging industries. For the past years, with the rapid development of government guide fund at all levels, it has become a key force in promoting regional economic development and industrial transformation and upgrading. However, with the increasing scale and investment of government guide fund, the moral hazard in the investment operation has become more and more serious so as to be one of the important factors restricting the sustainable development of government guide fund. In order to control and mitigate the moral hazard, there is an urgent need to improve the internal governance mechanism of government guide fund at present.
In its investment operation, government guide fund entrusts its capital to the fund manager for investment, and entrusts the supervision agency to supervise the investment at the same time in order to prevent the moral hazard of the fund manager. As a result, a double principal-agent relationship is formed. The return of the government guide fund comes from the performance of the sub fund, which depends on the choice of effort behavior made by two agents. Due to the information asymmetry between the government guide fund and its two agents, and inconsistency in their interests and goals pursued, both agents may take opportunistic behavior in order to maximize their utility. By improving the internal governance mechanism of government guide fund, the speculative motives of both agents can be suppressed and they are prompted to choose behaviors that align with the interests of government guide fund. This is of great significance for ensuring the achievement of policy objectives.
This paper studies how to design the internal governance mechanism of the government guide fund under the condition considering that both agents have the possibility of moral hazard and the coexistence of incentive mechanism, external supervision and punishment mechanism. At first, the supervision cost and penalty function are implanted into the HOLMSTROM and MILGROM incentive model. The model is expanded to establish a tripartite game model between government guide fund and its two agents. Then, this model is used to analyze the impact of changes in incentive intensity, supervision intensity and punishment intensity on default tendency, discuss the critical conditions for default behavior to occur, and study the role of supervision in suppressing default tendency of agent in order to determine whether the introduction of supervision mechanism is effective in reducing default tendency. Meanwhile, how the different compensation forms and the changes in incentive intensity will affect the optimal supervision intensity is analyzed to determine whether it is necessary to implement incentive compensation systems for supervision agency.
The result shows that: Firstly, by introducing external supervision and punishment mechanisms, the default behavior of the fund manager can be suppressed more effectively, and the fund manager is prompted to take actions that are in line with the interests of the government guide fund. Moreover, the default behavior decreases with the increase of supervision and punishment intensity. Secondly, the willingness of the supervision agency to implement supervision increases with the increase in the incentive intensity for it. By implementing incentive pay system, the moral hazard of supervision agency can be alleviated to a certain extent, which is conducive to maximizing the social benefits of the fund. Thirdly, setting a reasonable incentive level plays an important role in motivating the supervision agency to implement supervision. The incentive level for the supervision agency decreases with the increase of its risk aversion, the incentive level for the fund manager and the volatility of the fund performance. Finally, the costs of supervision and punishment intensity also have a significant impact on the optimal incentive level. These conclusions can provide theoretical and policy guidance for improving the management of government guide fund.

Key words: government guide fund, double moral hazard, incentive contract, supervision and punishment mechanism

摘要： 在政府引导基金的运行中,两个代理人与引导基金的利益和追求的目标不一致,在信息不对称下都有可能发生道德风险,导致政策目标不能实现。为解决这一问题,本文在考虑双重道德风险的情形下,将激励机制、外部监督和惩罚机制结合起来,建立引导基金与两个代理人的三方博弈模型,并利用该模型研究控制和缓解代理人的道德风险的机制。研究发现:引入外部监督和惩罚机制能更有效地抑制基金管理机构的违约行为,促使其采取符合引导基金利益的行为,而且违约行为随着监督惩罚力度的增加而减少。对受托监督机构实行激励薪酬制可在一定程度上缓解其道德风险并提高其实施监督的积极性。对受托监督机构的激励强度与其风险厌恶程度,对基金管理机构的激励强度和基金绩效波动性成反比。同时监督成本和惩罚力度对最优激励强度具有重要的影响。本文研究证实了引入监督和惩罚机制对减少违约行为的有效性。同时对受托监督机构实行激励薪酬制有利于加强监管,确保政策目标的实现。研究结论可以为改进和完善政府引导基金的管理提供理论和政策指导。

关键词: 政府引导基金, 双重道德风险, 激励契约, 监督惩罚机制