Abstract: With the deepening of industrialization and urbanization, the demand for urban construction land continues to rise. However, under the influence of development strategies such as food security, central government strictly controls the number of local construction land quotas every year, and the construction land resources required for economic development in various regions are seriously short. At the same time, a large number of rural labor has flooded into the city, resulting in idle or inefficient use of homestead.
In order to solve this problem, local governments such as Chengdu and Chongqing introduced the market mechanism into the quota transaction of construction land, but the index transaction price formulated by the cost plus pricing method failed to reflect its market value, and could not encourage farmers to actively withdraw from idle residential land and realize the reactivation of rural stock land. For the past years, scholars have focused on the production process, significance and transaction process of land use index for construction. Although scholars emphasize the defects of the land use index pricing transaction process, they have given policy suggestions from a qualitative point of view. However, they have failed to put forward a targeted pricing model. Therefore, it is imperative for governments to design an operable land use index pricing mechanism to alleviate the contradiction between the high demand for urban land and the low utilization rate of rural land.
Based on this, considering the complementarity of construction land index and construction land characteristics and construction land index system in practice, this paper improves a classic sealed complementary sequential auction model, and uses the improved model to study the pricing mechanism of construction land index.
The first part summarizes the complementarity between the construction land index and the characteristics of the construction land index, and the main characteristics of the construction land index transaction practice, and constructs the construction land index and the construction land quotation model. The quotation of construction land index is affected by the depreciation coefficient of land price and the number of bidders. The price of construction land is affected by the number of bidders, and the price of the loser in the bidding stage of land index is also affected by the depreciation coefficient of land price.
The second part discusses the related factors that affect land use index and land quotation. The index price of construction land has a negative relationship with the total number of bidders, and a positive relationship with the depreciation coefficient of land price. In the land auction stage, the total number of bidders increases and the land price increases. The land price of the loser in the bidding stage and the depreciation coefficient of land price show a reverse trend.
The third part discusses the farmers’land compensation income. Farmers’land compensation income and land price depreciation coefficient have a positive development trend, but have a reverse development trend with the total number of bidders.
The fourth part carries out a numerical analysis according to the relevant data of the construction land index trading practice. This verifies the relevant conclusions of the above theoretical research.
Finally, the conclusion is drawn that local governments can raise the requirements for qualification examination of participants, or increase the collection of penalty fees for idle construction land, in order to improve the transaction price of land use indicators, stimulate the enthusiasm of farmers to withdraw to the greatest extent, solve the problem with low the efficiency of rural land use, improve the current situation of China’s construction land spatial allocation, and make an intensive, efficient and sustainable use of land resources.
Although the sequential auction model of complementary products in this paper provides a new way to reveal the intrinsic value of land use indicators and solve the current land supply and demand problem, further exploration is needed: for example, there are still differences in the price discount rules between Chongqing and Chengdu, and which rules can better encourage farmers to voluntarily recultivate idle residential land is still to be discussed.

Key words: quota of construction land, improved sequential auction of complements, pricing mechanism, land use efficiency

摘要： 在引入用地指标与土地间相互依存特征前提下,本文改进了传统的互补品序贯拍卖模型,以期提出具有针对性的用地指标定价方法。研究表明,建设用地指标的成交价格受竞标人数和土地闲置费用的影响。竞标人指标报价随竞标人数递增而降低,但随土地闲置费递增而递增。进一步分析表明,适当提高土地闲置费用及资质审核要求可最大程度显化指标核心价值,激发农民退出闲置宅基地的积极性,提高农村用地的使用效率。研究为盘活农村闲置土地资产,实现可持续化发展给予了一定的理论参考。

关键词: 建设用地指标, 改进的互补品序贯拍卖, 定价机制, 土地利用效率