Abstract: The environmental pollution resulting from non-scale livestock and poultry waste has been one of the big problems in rural ecological environment governance. In the past period, in which the Chinese government led a poverty alleviation campaign, non-scale livestock and poultry breeding was used as an important measure helping the poor for its low technical requirement and less initial investment. Thereby, the quantity of breeding in relevant areas has increased sharply for the past years. However, due to the lack of a complete management system and necessary capital input, wastes produced by non-scale livestock and poultry breeding are not handled properly, which not only pollute the local soil and underground water, but also pose a threat to residents' physical health. Therefore, a systematic plan should be formulated to sustain economic development and protect the environment in the meantime.
The third-party governance pattern of non-scale livestock and poultry waste is effective to promote the sustainable development of non-scale livestock and poultry industry, in which specialized waste treatment enterprises take an active part in waste resource utilization under the guidance of government departments. The alternation of seasons is an objective factor which could cause interferences to the continuous running and stable development of the third-party governance pattern, but the influence of it has not been given sufficient attention in previous studies. From this point of view, an evolutionary game model reflecting the interactive relationships among farmers, the third-party enterprises and government departments is established, and the system dynamics simulation method is applied to analyze the effectiveness of various types of ecological subsidy policies for promoting the stability of the third-party governance pattern. With a comprehensive consideration of the data information obtained from the actual investigation and game model simulation analysis, the results show that there is no stable equilibrium strategy solution in the current interactions among three players, which means that subsidies and supports from the government side are necessary for the existence of the third-party governance pattern. Next, in all three subsidy policy scenarios, payoffs of the government departments are found to be higher than those in no subsidy scenario. Therefore, government departments should encourage and guide enterprises to participate in the disposal of non-scale livestock and poultry waste. Furthermore, compared with production subsidy and participation subsidy, the combined subsidy plan with a consideration of seasonal factors (government departments provide production subsidy to the third-party enterprises off season and provide participation subsidy in peak season) would be more effective for promoting the stability of the third-party governance pattern.
With a consideration of seasonal factor, the authors explore the promotion measures of the stability of the third-party governance pattern of non-scale livestock and poultry breeding waste, and this study aims at providing theoretical support and action proposals for policymakers to construct a more comprehensive resource utilization system of agricultural waste. The limitation of this paper is that though the authors have made this study and built a simulation model on the basis of real-life case, suggestions proposed by the paper would also face a lot of obstacles and uncertainties if they were applied in actual operations. In the specific implementation process, the actual situation of the third-party enterprises and local government departments should be considered. Secondly, for the sake of calculation, changes in the prices of organic manure and ecological carrying capacity are divided simply into that off season and in peak season respectively in this paper. In a follow-up study, we would expand the simulation model and explore the stable equilibrium strategy among three participants with dynamically changing organic manure price and ecological carrying capacity. In addition, modelling parameters in this paper are set according to the typical areas on the loess plateau. In the follow-up study, we would collect more data from different types of areas, and by substituting them in the simulation model, make a contrastive analysis, so that the results of our research would be more practical and reliable.

Key words: non-scale livestock and poultry breeding, agricultural waste resource utilization, seasonal factor, the third-party governance pattern

摘要： 在政府引导下,引入第三方企业对废弃物进行资源化利用,是促进非规模畜禽养殖业可持续发展的有效途径。考虑季节交替这一客观规律影响,本文构建了养殖户、第三方企业和政府三个利益相关主体所组成的演化博弈模型。通过将系统动力学仿真手段与动态演化思想相结合,论文对第三方治理稳定性促进方案经济性与有效性进行了分析。结果发现:在无补贴情境下,养殖户、第三方企业和政府部门之间不存在稳定演化均衡策略组合,即,政府的补贴和支持对于第三方治理模式存续是必要的;在本文所考虑的三种补贴方案中,政府整体收益均大于不补贴下的收益,因此,政府应积极引导并支持第三方企业参与养殖废弃物治理;相较于单纯对第三方企业进行生产补贴或参与补贴,基于季节交替设计的组合补贴方案(在淡季对第三方企业进行生产补贴,在旺季进行参与补贴)对于促进非规模畜禽养殖废弃物第三方治理模式稳定运行更加有效。本研究为推动农业废弃物综合利用提供了理论支持与行动建议。

关键词: 非规模畜禽养殖, 农业废弃物资源化利用, 季节因素, 第三方治理模式