Abstract: As a consequence of the accelerated technological revolution and industrial transformation, numerous innovative start-ups have emerged in China, forming a growing force that significantly impacts the country's economic development. Due to their unsecured nature, lack of substantial assets, and low returns, start-ups are unable to secure traditional funding like angel funds, venture capital, bank loans. In response, crowdfunding platforms leveraging the Internet to mobilize private funds have evolved into a vital source of finance for start-ups facing financial difficulties. However, as crowdfunding platforms proliferate, the competition among them has become increasingly intense. In 2020, the number of crowdfunding platforms in China decreased monthly and the market concentration of the crowdfunding industry gradually increased. To attract projects and foster user engagement, several crowdfunding platforms have ventured into offering value-added services to project sponsors, often accompanied by increased service fees.
Existing research predominantly focuses on pricing strategies for value-added services offered by general web platforms, with a notable absence of tailored theories specifically for crowdfunding platforms. Most of China's crowdfunding platforms adopt the AON (All-or-Nothing) model. If the project is not successfully financed, the platform will return all the financing amount to the investors without charging any fees. Unlike online platforms in general, the success rate of projects directly affects the revenue of a crowdfunding platform. Based on the above background, the purpose of this paper is to explore the optimal pricing structure and strategy for value-added services on Internet crowdfunding platforms, and try to answer the following key questions: What factors will affect the pricing of services when an Internet crowdfunding platform provides value-added services? How do these factors affect pricing strategies?
This paper addresses the research gap in pricing value-added services on crowdfunding platforms by establishing a model grounded on the phenomenon of platform competition in real-world. This model provides a basis for crowdfunding platforms to devise pricing strategies that can help them control costs and enhance profits. Based on the two-sided market theory, this paper constructs a Hotelling optimization model with the aim of profit maximization and uses game-theoretic methods to calculate and analyze the optimal pricing structure and pricing strategy of a crowdfunding platform that is the first to provide value-added services under duopoly competition.
The results show that: (1)Under appropriate conditions, the duopoly crowdfunding platform should take the lead in providing value-added services, and the platform that takes the lead in providing services can set higher prices and obtain higher profits. When the utility of value-added services is sufficiently large relative to marginal costs, the platform that takes the lead in providing services will take the market advantage. (2)The optimal pricing of the platform is related to the project success rate, cross-network effect, transportation cost, value-added service utility and marginal cost. When the utility of value-added services is sufficiently large relative to marginal costs, the platform that takes the lead in providing services can adopt the highest level of investment. At this time, pricing only needs to consider utility and does not need to focus on costs. (3)As the marginal cost of value-added services increases, the platform that takes the lead in providing value-added services should reduce its investment and pricing, while the rival platform should raise its pricing. With an increase in the utility coefficient of value-added services, the platform that takes the lead in providing services should increase its investment and raise its price, while the rival platform should lower its price. (4)The more significant the cross-network effect on other project initiators generated by the new investors attracted by a project, the lower the pricing of the crowdfunding platform. For projects that attract additional investors, the platform should lower its price. The results provide vital insights and practical guidance for crowdfunding platforms as they formulate value-added service pricing strategies.

Key words: two-sided market, crowdfunding platform, value-added service, pricing strategy, cross-network effects

摘要： 中国互联网众筹平台竞争激烈,行业集中度不断提高。因此,增值服务因其增加用户粘性,提高平台竞争力而被平台管理者高度重视。文章基于双边市场理论构建以利润最大化为目标的Hotelling模型,探讨双寡头众筹平台是否应当率先提供增值服务以及如何制定最优定价策略。研究表明:(1)在适当条件下,双寡头众筹平台应当率先提供增值服务,率先提供服务的平台可以设定更高价格,获取更高利润。在增值服务效用相对于边际成本足够大时,该平台将占据市场优势;(2)最优定价与项目成功率、交叉网络效应、交通成本、增值服务效用、边际成本相关。在增值服务效用相对于边际成本足够大时,率先提供服务的平台可以采取最高水平投资,此时定价只需考虑效用,无需关注成本;(3)随着增值服务边际成本增大,率先提供服务的平台应减少投资并降低定价,对手平台应提高定价。随着增值服务效用系数增大,率先提供服务的平台应增加投资并提高定价,对手平台应降低定价;(4)项目吸引的新投资者对其他项目发起者产生的交叉网络效应越大时,众筹平台定价越低。对于能吸引较多新投资者的明星项目,平台应降低定价。

关键词: 双边市场, 众筹平台, 增值服务, 定价策略, 交叉网络效应