Abstract: In recent years, the trade friction between China and the United States, coupled with the COVID-19, has had a major impact on the development of China’s manufacturing industry, and China has timely proposed the construction of a new development pattern of “double circulation”. Building a superior manufacturing industry chain and promoting it to the high end are the fundamental grasp for implementing the new development pattern, and is the key to the “double circulation” to promote each other. At the same time, representative of China’s high-end manufacturing, the industrial chain of complex products is still not perfect, with its presence heavier in the upstream development field led by the main manufacturer, than in the downstream after-sales service field, which also has high added value, and the new development pattern of “double circulation” is pushing the main manufacturer to implement the “brand extension” strategy, to continue to extend to the high-end of the value chain and penetrate into the field of aftermarket service for complex products. It is worth noting that in the current market of aftermarket service of complex products in China, the main manufacturer is mainly responsible for assisting the aftermarket vendors to provide services, but with the promotion of new development pattern of “double circulation” and the implementation of “brand extension” strategy, the main manufacturer has just started to consider introducing their own service brands to compete with aftermarket vendors. Obviously, whether the main manufacturer introduces its own service brands will have a certain impact on the related enterprises and supply chain system. In addition, quality awareness is the basis of quality behavior and quality behavior is the external expression of quality awareness. The safety incidents of complex products caused by aftermarket service quality problems have made supply chain decision makers realize that it is necessary to pay attention to the role of quality awareness in the aftermarket service quality control of complex products. Therefore, by combining the characteristics of the development of collaborative services for complex products in China at the present stage, the internal influence relationship between the main manufacturer and aftermarket vendors is deeply discussed, and the impact of the main manufacturer’s own service brand introduction strategy and the quality awareness of aftermarket vendors on the equilibrium of the supply chain is analyzed, which are important for realizing the optimization and upgrading the “R&D-manufacturing-service” industrial chain of complex products in China.
In view of this, taking the complex product aftermarket service supply chain composed of the main manufacturer and aftermarket vendors as the research object, according to the market situation in which the main manufacturer introduces its own service brand and aftermarket vendors are from cooperation to co-opetition, based on the quality awareness parameter of the aftermarket vendors’ advantage, two Stackelberg game models are constructed, in which, 1.the aftermarket vendor is the leader and the main manufacturer introduces its own service brand, and 2.the aftermarket vendor is the leader and the main manufacturer does not introduce its own service brand. And then by comparing the equilibrium results obtained, the influence of a quality awareness level and introduction of its own service brand on supply chain equilibrium is analyzed.
The results shows that the aftermarket vendors improve their quality awareness level. Although this is conducive to the cooperation between the two parties and the profit of aftermarket vendors, it will cause the aftermarket vendors to have a quality cannibalization effect on main manufacturer and will not necessarily be conducive to the profit of main manufacturer. Whether and when the main manufacturer will introduce its own service brand depends on its own quality cost coefficient and the quality awareness level of the aftermarket vendors. When the quality awareness of aftermarket vendors is at a high level, the main manufacturer’s introduction of its own service brand may be beneficial to aftermarket vendors, and at this time, the main manufacturer and aftermarket vendors can achieve a “win-win” situation. In addition, the entire supply chain system may benefit from a higher quality cost scheme for the main manufacturer, although the main manufacturer’s interests may be affected. In general, it is expected that the results of this study will provide some reference to the management practices of the main manufacturer and aftermarket vendors in a competitive game environment. There are still some limitations and shortcomings in the research process. Firstly, in this paper, the relationship between the main manufacturer and aftermarket vendors is a spontaneous and active cooperative one, and subsequent research can try to design a contractual mechanism or authorization mechanism to enhance an in-depth cooperation between the main manufacturer and aftermarket vendors. Secondly, after the main manufacturer introduces its own service brand, the aftermarket service will be divided between the main manufacturer and aftermarket vendors. Subsequent research can build a co-opetition game model considering a share ratio of aftermarket service to study how the share ratio affects the decision making of enterprises in the aftermarket service supply chain of complex products.

Key words: complex products, quality awareness, own service brand, co-opetition strategy

摘要： 本文针对复杂产品主制造商引入自有服务品牌与售后服务商从合作转变为竞合关系的市场情形,引入体现售后服务商优势的质量意识参数,构建了售后服务商为领导者,主制造商是否引入自有服务品牌的两种Stackelberg博弈模型,进而通过对所得均衡结果进行对比,分析质量意识水平、自有服务品牌引入对供应链均衡的影响。研究表明,售后服务商提高其质量意识水平,虽有利于主售双方协同合作及自身盈利,但会促使售后服务商对主制造商产生质量挤兑效应且不一定有利于主制造商盈利;主制造商是否以及何时引入自有服务品牌取决于自身质量成本系数以及售后服务商的质量意识水平;当售后服务商的质量意识处于高水平时,主制造商引入自有服务品牌能够实现“共赢”;另外,整个供应链系统可能会从主制造商质量成本更高的方案中受益,尽管主制造商利益可能会受到影响。

关键词: 复杂产品, 质量意识, 自有服务品牌, 竞合策略