Abstract: With the accelerated transformation and upgrading of China's economic structure and the increasing degree of market internationalization, the competitive environment faced by enterprises has become increasingly fierce. In order to better survive and develop in the market, many enterprises choose aggressive strategies in the hope of gaining a competitive advantage in fierce market competition. However, whether the aggressiveness of corporate strategy can effectively enhance the risk-taking level of corporate investment projects remains a question.
Corporate strategy is the medium to long-term development goals determined by a company and the series or set of decisions and actions to achieve these goals. Strategy serves as the highest guideline for corporate management and operation and the way of resource allocation. Different strategic choices imply differences in organizational structure, talent allocation, management power and characteristics, and corporate culture orientation, all of which can affect the willingness of corporate managers to undertake risky investment projects. Corporate risk-taking is a willingness choice by corporate managers to undertake high-risk but potentially high-return investment projects, which is significantly influenced by internal governance characteristics and factors as well as the external governance environment.
Existing literature has explored the impact of corporate strategy choices on the level of corporate risk-taking. Some scholars argue that the higher the aggressiveness of a corporate strategy, the higher the level of corporate risk-taking. However, the higher the aggressiveness of a company's strategy relative to other companies in the same industry, the greater the cost of exploring new strategies. This can lead to increased operating and financial risks for the company and greater uncertainty regarding future operating performance. Moreover, the higher the aggressiveness of a corporate strategy, the more it exacerbates the information asymmetry between shareholders, creditors, and other stakeholders and management. This can lead to weakened supervision of management by shareholders, resulting in the risk of over-investment by management. Additionally, increased information asymmetry can lead to higher external financing constraints for the company, thereby increasing the risk of tight funding needs for investment projects. Furthermore, some scholars have empirically found that differences in corporate strategy can lead to higher borrowing interest rates, shorter borrowing terms, and smaller borrowing amounts from banks. This makes it difficult for companies to obtain the funds needed for investment projects and reduces their ability to pursue high-risk, high-return projects.
This paper takes listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in China from 2007 to 2021 as the research sample and empirically examines the interactive impact of corporate strategic aggressiveness and ownership concentration on the level of corporate risk-taking. The purpose is to answer the following questions: (1)Does strategic aggressiveness contribute to enhancing the level of corporate risk-taking? (2)Does ownership concentration affect the level of corporate risk-taking? (3)Does the level of ownership concentration significantly influence the relationship between strategic aggressiveness and risk-taking?
The results show that the higher the corporate strategic aggressiveness, the higher the level of corporate risk-taking. However, this positive correlation is weakened as ownership concentration increases. The higher the ownership concentration, the lower the level of corporate risk-taking, and this negative correlation is enhanced as strategic aggressiveness increases. Further research indicates that these relationships are mainly observed in non-state-owned enterprises with combined CEO and chairman roles, companies with lower growth potential, non-high-tech enterprises, and regions with a higher degree of marketization. The conclusions of this study enrich the literature on the economic consequences of corporate strategic aggressiveness and the factors affecting corporate risk-taking. They also provide important insights for how companies can choose appropriate development strategies based on their ownership structure characteristics and risk-taking capabilities, as well as for government departments to further improve the modern corporate ownership governance structure to promote corporate strategic risk-taking and support the accelerated high-quality development of China's economy.

Key words: strategic aggressiveness, ownership concentration, risk taking level, nature of ownership, marketization level

摘要： 我国经济加快转型升级趋势下企业面临的市场竞争环境日益激烈,许多企业选择激进型战略以期获得市场竞争优势,然而企业战略激进度能否有效提升企业风险承担水平,以及不同股权集中度下是否会带来显著影响效应差异？本文以2007—2021年我国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了企业战略激进度与股权集中度对企业风险承担的交互影响效应,结果发现:企业战略激进度越高,则企业风险承担水平也表现越高,但该正相关关系将随着企业股权集中度的上升而受到削弱;股权集中度越高,则企业风险承担水平表现越低,且该负相关关系会随着战略激进度的上升而得到增强。进一步研究表明,上述影响关系主要存在于两职合一的非国有企业、成长性较低企业、非高新技术企业以及市场化程度较高地区。研究结论丰富了企业选择不同战略激进度经济后果以及企业风险承担影响因素的相关文献,对于企业如何根据自身股权结构特征及风险承担能力选择合适发展战略,以及政府部门进一步完善现代公司股权治理结构来促进企业战略风险承担水平以助力我国经济加快高质量发展等有重要启示。

关键词: 战略激进度, 股权集中度, 风险承担水平, 产权性质, 市场化水平