Abstract: As a concentrated manifestation of information technology development and service model innovation, cloud computing has become an important foundation for the digital transformation of enterprises, and the cloud service industry has gradually formed an ecosystem oriented to user needs. Cloud user requirements mainly include cost control, resilience, reliability, security, and data privacy. Cost control, resilience and reliability are closely related to the number of user requirements. Acquiring demand quantity information can ensure that cloud service providers offer stable and reliable cloud services. In the cloud service supply chain, cloud platform operators possess an advantage in acquiring demand information because of their proximity to users. However, the impact of information acquisition and disclosure behaviors on the entire cloud service supply chain remains inadequately explored. In addition, the special cost structure and replicability of cloud products make it unnecessary for downstream enterprises to order products and manage inventory in advance, and upstream enterprises do not need to arrange production in advance, so the signals for conveying demand information in traditional supply chains are invalid in cloud service supply chains. Revenue-sharing contract is the main mode of cooperation between upstream and downstream of cloud service supply chain, and there is limited research on using revenue distribution ratio as a signal to address the problem of asymmetric demand information in cloud service supply chain.
Based on the above background, this study focuses on a cloud service supply chain consisting of a cloud application developer and a cloud platform operator, who cooperate under a revenue-sharing contract. By considering varying information structures based on user demand, this study constructs three models: complete information, incomplete information, and information asymmetry. A comparative analysis is conducted on the optimal decisions and profits for both the cloud platform operator and the cloud application developer under these three models. The analysis reveals the value of acquiring and sharing demand information. The main conclusions are as follows:
Firstly, the cloud platform operator does not always benefit from information acquisition behavior, which could be worsened by profit losses stemming from the upward distortion of the revenue distribution ratio. Secondly, when the investment coefficient of cloud service product performance is in a certain range and the retained profit of cloud application developers is at a high level, the cloud platform operator’s information acquisition behavior can lead to win-win outcomes. Thirdly, the cloud platform operator should choose information sharing. Conversely, for the cloud application developer, such sharing does not necessarily enable it to make profit. It only enhances its profit when retained profits are below the threshold. Lastly, when retained profits are low, information sharing leads to higher expected price, expected performance, and expected demand for cloud service products, and disclosure by cloud platform operators is beneficial to both parties.
In terms of theoretical contributions, firstly, this paper innovatively takes the income distribution ratio as the signal, considers the unique cost structure of information products, and uses the signaling game method to explore the problem of information asymmetry of user demand, which provides the basis for the decision-making process of the involved parties. Secondly, unlike previous studies that only focus on the impact of demand information disclosure on upstream and downstream profits, this paper emphasizes the value of information acquisition by the cloud platform operator through historical data and prediction models in the context of big data, which makes up for the limitations of the existing studies concerning information acquisition strategies and the value of demand information. Lastly, the paper thoroughly considers the implications of diverse information strategies on the members, measuring the value of information and selecting appropriate strategies for information disclosure. This allows for a better understanding of the nature of information value and the factors that influence it.
This paper can be further extended. Future research could explore scenarios where participants in the cloud service supply chain have access to different information simultaneously or examine competition among multiple participants.

Key words: information acquisition, signal game, demand information disclosure, information value

摘要： 针对一个由云应用开发商和云平台运营商构成的云服务供应链,构建了完全信息、不完全信息和信息不对称模型,对比分析云服务供应链成员在不同模型下的最优决策及收益,探究了云平台运营商对用户基础需求信息获取和披露的价值。研究发现:云平台运营商并不总是从信息获取行为中获益,收入分配比例向上扭曲导致的利润损失可能使其变得更糟;当云服务产品性能投资系数在一定范围内且云应用开发商的保留利润偏高时信息获取行为对双方利润提升均有利,此时双方能够实现共赢。当云应用开发商的保留利润较低时,信息共享使得云服务产品的期望价格、期望性能和期望需求提高,云平台运营商的信息披露始终对其有利,当且仅当云应用开发商的保留利润小于阈值时,信息共享才能为云应用开发商带来更高的利润。

关键词: 信息获取, 信号博弈, 需求信息披露, 信息价值