Abstract: Considering the fact that inter-industry platform cooperation improves users' intrinsic benefit, the paper constructs a duopoly model with consumer multi-homing to analyze economic effects of the cooperation. The analysis shows that as the intrinsic benefit of users on the cooperation platform increases, not only prices on its both sides, but its asymmetry of pricing structure and demand will rise. But as to the non-cooperation platform, inter-industry platform cooperation drives prices on its both sides and demand on the single-homing side fall. We also find that if the difference between cooperation platform and non-cooperation platform is large enough on the single-homing side, the non-cooperation platform will decrease the price of this side more than that of the other side. Otherwise, the non-cooperation platform will decrease the price of the multi-homing side more than that of the single-homing side. The paper also indicates that inter-industry platform cooperation improves the profit of the cooperation platform, reduces the profit of the non-cooperation platform, and enhances the consumers' surplus and social welfare. This reminds the regulatory agency that it should pay more and more attention to public policies on cooperation in two-sided market to avoid excessive interference.

Key words: two-sided markets, platform cooperation, Hotelling model, intrinsic benefit, multi-homing

摘要： 本文针对合作后平台用户固有收益水平提高这一特征,在用户多归属情形下构建双寡头Hotelling竞争模型,分析了产业间平台合作的经济效应。研究发现,随着合作带来参与平台用户固有收益提高,该平台两边用户定价、价格非对称性和用户规模均上升。对非合作平台,合作会降低其双边用户定价和用户规模,而合作对定价非对称性的影响,则须视平台差异的程度而定。研究还表明,合作提高了参与平台利润,降低了非参与平台利润,同时还增加了消费者总剩余和社会总福利。这启示规制机构在对双边平台合作进行规制时要特别谨慎,切忌过度干预。

关键词: 双边市场, 平台合作, Hotelling模型, 固有收益, 多归属