[1] Becker G. Crime and punishment: an economic approach[J]. Journal Political Economy, 1968, 76(2): 169-217. [2] Cornish D B, Clarker R. The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Perspectives on Offending[M]. Springer-Verlag, 1986. [3] Tongo C I. Dynamic programming and deployment of a crime preventive patrol force[J]. European Journal of Social Sciences, 2010, 15(3): 354-364. [4] Shan X, Zhuang J. Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender attacker game[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, 228(1): 262-272. [5] Shan X, Zhuang J. Modeling credible retaliation threats in deterring the smuggling of nuclear weapons using partial inspections: a three stage game[J]. Decision Analysis, 2014, 11(1): 43-62. [6] Berman O, Gavious A. Location of terror response facilities: a game between state and terrorist[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2007, 177(2): 1113-1133. [7] Merrick J, Parnell G. A comparative analysis of PRA and intelligent adversary methods for counterterrorism management[J]. Risk Analysis, 2011, 31(9): 1488-1510. [8] Rios Insua D, Rios J, Banks D. Adversarial risk analysis[J]. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 2009, 104(486): 841-854. [9] 韩传峰,孟令鹏,张超,孔静静.基于完全信息动态博弈的反恐设施选址模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2012,32(2):366-372. [10] 魏国强,罗晓棠.应急资源布局与调度的模糊决策模型[J].计算机工程,2011,37(22):284-288. [11] 柴瑞瑞,孙康,陈静锋,刘德海.连续恐怖袭击下反恐设施选址与资源调度优化模型及其应用[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(2):464-472. [12] Rios J, Rios Insua D. Adversarial risk analysis for counterterrorism modelling[J]. Risk Analysis, 2012, 32(5): 894-915. [13] Parnell G, Banks D,Borio L. Report on methodological improvements to the department of homeland security's biological agent risk analysis[M]. National Academies Press, 2008. [14] Rios J, Rios Insua D. Balanced increment and concession methods for negotiation support[J]. RACSAM-Revista de la Real Academia de Ciencias Exactas, Fisicasy Naturales. Serie A. Matematicas, 2010, 104(1): 41-56. [15] Sevillano J C, Rios Insua D, Rios J. Adversarial risk analysis: the somali pirates case[J]. Decision Analysis, 2012, 9(2): 86-95. [16] Wang S, Banks D. Network routing for insurgency an adversarial risk analysis framework[J]. Naval Research Logistics, 2012, 58(6): 595-607. [17] Dyer J S, Sarin R K. Measurablemulti-attribute value functions[J]. Operations Research, 1979, 27(4): 810-822. [18] 程书萍.重大基础设施工程管理中的适应性选择原理与策略[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(2):153-157. [19] Rios Insua D, González-Ortega J, Banks D. Concept uncertainty in adversarial statistical decision theory[M]. The Mathematics of the Uncertain, Springer, Cham, 2018. [20] Kaplan A. The counter-terrorism puzzle: a guide for decision makers[M]. Routledge, 2017. [21] Mazicioglu D, Merrick J R W. Behavioral modeling of adversaries with multiple objectives in counterterrorism[J]. Risk Analysis, 2018, 38(5): 962-977. [22] Shachter R. Evaluating influence diagrams[J]. Operations Research, 1986, 34(6): 871-882. [23] Concha B, Muller P, Rios Insua D. Decision analysis by augmented probability simulation[J]. Management Science, 1999, 45(7): 995-1007. [24] Gil C, Rios Insua D, Rios J. Adversarial risk analysis for urban security resource allocation[J]. Risk Analysis, 2016, 26(4): 727-741. |