Abstract: Thegamemodelis constructed between an OEM and a remanufacturer in order to analyze the effect of designing for remanufacturing on the competition under the different ways of bearing for the designing for remanufacturing cost based on authorization remanufacturing. Based on the game model, the effect of designing for remanufacturing on the optimal Nash equilibrium solution is comparatively analyzed under the different load-bearing ways. The main research results are as follows: the authorization remanufacturing can not only change the OEM’s competitive disadvantage, but also increase its revenue; Based on the authorization remanufacturing, the OEM and remanufacturer are willing to bear the cost of designing for remanufacturing only when the design for remanufacturing brings a large amount of revenue to the two unit products; although the design for remanufacturing can reduce the unit retail price of the two product, it does not always increase consumer surplus.

Key words: OEM, remanufacturer, authorization remanufacturing, design for remanufacturing

摘要： 为分析授权再制造下, 再制造设计对制造/再制造影响, 构建了再制造设计不同承担模式下原始制造商与再制造商博弈模型, 对比分析再制造设计费用不同承担模式下, 再制造设计对最优纳什均衡解影响。研究主要得到:授权再制造不仅可以改变原始制造商市场竞争不利地位, 还可以增加其收益; 在授权再制造下, 只有再制造设计带给两种单位产品收益之比较大时, 两者才愿意承担再制造设计费用; 虽然再制造设计可以减少两种产品单位零售价格, 但是再制造设计不一定总是增加消费者剩余。

关键词: 原始制造商, 再制造商, 授权再制造, 再制造设计