Abstract: The paper establishes the sequential game model considering the water resourcestax based on the background of the double marginalization caused by the policy of “plant-net separation”.Under the background of “plant-net separation”, the impact of water resources tax on the optimal decision-making of the game participants (power plants, power grids) and the efficiency of the supply chain are discussed. The main factors affecting on-grid tariff and supply chain efficiency are investigated.The conclusion shows that the reduction of the water resources tax will negatively affect the optimal power price of power plants, which in turn will promote power sales of power plants and increase their net profit, and ultimately weaken the double marginalization and improve the efficiency of the supply chain. In addition, this paper uses numerical examples to verify the main research findings.

Key words: double marginalization, plant-net seperation, water resourcestax, supply chain efficiency

摘要： 以电厂和电网分开政策下引发的双重边际效应为背景,建立了考虑水资源税的序贯博弈模型。在“厂网分开”背景下,探讨了水资源税对博弈参与方(电厂、电网)最优决策、供应链效率的影响。考察了影响上网电价及供应链效率的主要因素。结论显示,水资源税的下调会负向影响电厂最优电价,进而促进电厂售电量、提升其净利润,最终削弱双重边际效应,改善了供应链效率。此外,本文运用数值算例验证了主要研究发现。

关键词: 双重边际效应, 厂网分开, 水资源税, 供应链效率