Abstract: In order to effectively curb the phenomenon of road freight overloading and deepen the reform of “delegating regulation and serving” in the field of traffic law enforcement, this study takes transporters, inspectors and traffic control departments as stakeholders to establish a tripartite evolutionary game model to study the process of overloading transportation. The decision-making evolution process of each stakeholder is analyzed, and the evolution path of the stabilization strategy is simulated and analyzed, and the over-control effects of different policy strengths under different parameter combinations are compared. The study finds that increasing the penalty coefficient of over-limit and overloaded transportation can significantly regulate the behavior of transporters; the lower the management cost, the more likely the regulatory department’s strategy to evolve in the direction of active supervision; there are two possible evolutionary and stable strategies in the tripartite game system. Punishment of inspectors’ passive law enforcement behaviors and increased investment in capital and equipment can improve the probability of the system evolving to an optimal state.

Key words: stakeholders, overloading, evolutionary game, simulation analysis

摘要： 为有效遏制公路货运超限超载现象,深化交通执法领域的“放管服”改革,本研究针对运输者、稽查人员和交管部门等利益相关者,建立三方演化博弈模型,研究超限超载运输中各利益主体的决策演化过程,并对稳定策略的演化路径进行仿真分析,比较不同参数组合下不同政策力度的治理效果。研究发现,提高超限超载运输的处罚系数可以明显规范运输者的行为;管理成本越低,监管部门的策略越可能向积极监管的方向演化;三方博弈系统存在两种可能的演化稳定策略,加重对稽查人员消极执法行为的处罚、加大资金设备投入能够提高系统向最优状态演化的概率。

关键词: 利益相关者, 超限超载, 演化博弈, 仿真分析