Abstract: A crowdsourcing logistics service network equilibrium model is developed with three layers' network structure of service demanders, crowdsourcing platforms and service providers. The variational inequality is used to describe the equilibrium state considering the optimal behavior of each member of the crowdsourcing logistics service network, and the impact of fines imposed by crowdsourcing platforms on service providers with substandard service quality on the service network is considered. The result shows that the implementation of the penalty policy on the crowdsourcing platforms will prompt the service providers to improve their own service quality, and the service quality and profits of the crowdsourcing platforms will increase accordingly. However, blindly increasing the fine will reduce not only the profits of service providers, but also the service quality and profits of the crowdsourcing platforms. So an appropriate penalty interval should be chosen. When increasing the competition platform, the transaction volume, transaction price and the profits of the service providers will increase, but the profits of the original crowdsourcing platform will decrease. If the fines imposed by a certain platform are too high, the service quality of the platform will improve in the short term, but the profits will decrease, and the service quality of the original crowdsourcing platforms will decrease, and the profits will increase.

Key words: crowdsourcing logistics, network equilibrium, variational inequality, projection shrinkage algorithm, service quality

摘要： 为优化众包物流服务质量,考虑平台罚金政策,构建了包括发包方、众包平台和接包方在内的三层众包物流服务网络模型,并进行算例分析。结果表明,众包平台实施罚金政策并加大自身服务质量投入成本会促使接包方改善自身的服务质量,众包平台的服务质量和利润随之增大,但一味的增大罚金不但会使得接包方利润下降,众包平台的服务质量和利润也呈稍微下降趋势,因此平台应该选择合适的罚金区间;平台在竞争的同时也要进行一定的合作,因为平台间同步协调改进罚金政策以及质量投入会取得更大的收益和更高的平均服务质量。

关键词: 众包物流, 网络均衡, 变分不等式, 投影收缩算法, 服务质量