Abstract: Taking OACT anti-counterfeiting system as a research object, the anti-counterfeiting investment decision-making mechanism of brand manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain has been studied. Three anti-counterfeiting technology investment decision-making game model, including non-cooperation, cooperation and supply chain integration are established. The equilibrium of anti-counterfeiting credibility, anti-counterfeiting investment threshold and profit are obtained and compared. In the end, The HSN contract coordination mechanism of supply chain anti-counterfeiting investment is established. The result shows that the reliability of anti-counterfeiting increases with the market penetration rate of counterfeit product and decreases with the cost coefficient of investment. Meanwhile, the reliability of anti-counterfeiting is the lowest under the condition of noncooperation, lower under the condition of cooperation and the highest under the condition of supply chain integration, whereas the anti-counterfeiting investment threshold is the highest under the condition of noncooperation, higher under the condition of cooperation and the lowest under the condition of supply chain integration.

Key words: overt anti-counterfeiting technologies, reliability of anti-counterfeit, supply chain decision

摘要： 以OACT防伪体系为研究对象,研究了供应链中品牌厂商及零售商的防伪投资决策机制。建立了产品品牌商与零售商的防伪技术投资决策非合作、决策合作及供应链整合三种决策机制下的博弈模型,得到了三种机制下的均衡防伪可信度、均衡防伪投资阈值以及均衡利润,并进行了比较分析。最后,建立了产品显性防伪技术的供应链防伪投资HSN契约协调机制。研究发现均衡防伪可信度始终随市场假货渗透率的增加而增加,随防伪投资成本系数增加而减少。同时均衡防伪可信度在投资非合作决策机制下最低,在投资合作决策机制下次之,供应链整合情形下最高;均衡防伪投资阈值在非合作决策机制下最低,投资合作情形下次之,供应链整合情形下最高。

关键词: 显性防伪技术, 防伪可信度, 供应链决策