Abstract: In recent years, with the continuous promotion of China’s opening-up strategy and the implementation of the “Belt and Road” initiative, cross-border trade in China has been growing steadily. There has been an increasing demand from businesses for multimodal transport services, leading more and more enterprises tooutsource their multimodal transport services to third-party logistics companies to fulfill their trade orders. As a result, the market for multimodal transport service procurement has started to take shape. However, the rules and standards in the current market for multimodal transport procurement are not yet well-established, so that this causes some problems such as information asymmetry, frequent vicious competition, and inconsistent transportation service quality. These problems hinder effective resource allocation and compromise the quality of transportation services. Auctions, as an effective method for allocating scarce resources based on fair competition and improving the efficiency of resource utilization, have been widely used in the field of transportation service procurement. Existing procurement mechanisms for transportation services mainly revolve around combinatorial auctions and multi-attribute auctions, meeting the demand of shippers to procure multiple routes and consider both price and non-price factors. However, there is still room for improvement in the application of these mechanisms in the procurement of multimodal transport services. On the one hand, due to the complexity of multimodal transport transactions, shippers need to focus on resource utilization in auctions to avoid multiple transactions and excessive transaction costs. On the other hand, while pursuing a “win-win” situation that maximizes social welfare, the shipper’s profit also needs to be adequately safeguarded. Therefore, it is necessary to research and explore a multi-attribute combinatorial auction mechanism that balances resource utilization and shipper’s profit, in order to further enhance the applicability of existing mechanisms and meet the practical needs of the multimodal transport procurement market.
Firstly, this paper integrates the quality and cost of transportation services and defines the shipper’s valuation function and the transportation service provider’s cost function. To address the discrepancy in total bidding quantities across different routes, a priority allocation factor is introduced to adjust the shipper’s valuation function. Secondly, with the objective of maximizing social welfare, we construct a model for designing the multi-attribute combinatorial auction mechanism. Taking into account the shipper’s profit, we design an improved PA-VCG mechanism, based on the VCG mechanism. This mechanism aims to improve the allocation of routes and payment prices while considering both quality and price aspects. Thirdly, to further validate the reliability and efficiency of the mechanism, this paper provides theoretical proofs of important properties such as incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Finally, in the context of multi-modal transportation and using actual demand data from China’s export trade, we conduct an experimental analysis. The improved PA-VCG mechanism is compared with existing mechanisms from the perspectives of resource utilization, social welfare, and customer satisfaction. The allocation and payment results of the improved PA-VCG mechanism under different parameter settings are analyzed to validate the reasonableness of the parameter settings and provide reference for the practical application of the mechanism. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that the improved PA-VCG mechanism not only increases the shipper’s profit compared to the VCG mechanism but also satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Based on a “win-win” approach, this mechanism ensures the shipper’s profit and motivates transportation service providers to participate in the auction, improving procurement reliability. The experimental results confirm that the improved PA-VCG mechanism, which incorporates a priority allocation factor into the shipper’s valuation function, effectively balances route allocation. By achieving satisfactory social welfare and customer satisfaction, this mechanism assists shippers in optimizing resource utilization through the adjustment of the priority allocation factor weight values. It enhances the flexibility of shipper decision-making, ensuring efficient procurement processes. Furthermore, the mechanism maximizes the shipper’s profit to the greatest extent while meeting the requirements of incentive compatibility and individual rationality. The incremental benefit brought to the shipper increases with their demand volume.
In summary, this paper proposes an improved PA-VCG mechanism for multi-modal transport service procurement by modifying and expanding upon the VCG mechanism. This mechanism considers resource utilization and shipper profit, enriching the theoretical methods for designing multi-attribute combinatorial auction mechanisms. It enhances the applicability of existing transportation service procurement mechanisms in the context of multi-modal transport service procurement, meeting the practical procurement demands of shippers while emphasizing cooperative relationships. It will contribute to achieve reliable and efficient multi-modal transport service procurement, thereby promoting the long-term high-quality development of the logistics industry and providing a guarantee for the sustained prosperity of international trade. Furthermore, as the future multi-modal transportation procurement market continues to improve, a new model will gradually emerge where multiple shippers and multiple transportation service providers conduct transactions based on online platforms. Subsequent studies will further introduce online auction methods that allow real-time transactions between the trading parties, combined with the “multi-to-multi” bilateral trading environment, to optimize and enhance the mechanism, making it more adaptable to the complex and dynamic market environment.

Key words: multimodal transportation procurement; multi-attribute; combinatorial auction; mechanism design; incentive compatibility; shipper’s revenue; resource utilization rate

摘要： 随着多式联运的发展,托运人的采购需求日益复杂。现有采购机制主要围绕组合拍卖和多属性拍卖展开,满足托运人采购多种线路和考虑价格、非价格因素的需求。为进一步增强机制适用性,本文兼顾托运人收益及资源利用率,基于VCG机制,设计了一种多属性组合拍卖改进机制即改进PA-VCG机制,在考虑质量与价格的前提下,改善线路的分配及支付价格。理论分析表明,改进PA-VCG机制不仅较VCG机制增加了托运人收益,还满足激励相容与个体理性。实验结果表明,改进PA-VCG机制给托运人带来的收益增量随线路需求量的增加而增加,同时,实现良好的资源利用率,社会福利和客户满意率。因此,本文机制满足了托运人的实际采购需求,且重视合作关系,有助于实现可靠、高效的多式联运服务采购。

关键词: 多式联运采购, 多属性, 组合拍卖, 机制设计, 激励相容, 托运人收益, 资源利用率