Abstract: With the digital economy developing rapidly, the omni-channel retail model, which gradually integrates online and offline, is becoming more and more popular, and it is becoming easier for consumers to access product information from different channels. In order to compete for a larger market share, the omni-channel retailer often takes the stage of price promotion to attract consumers to purchase. Although various promotion and discount activities can quickly increase the sales revenue, it will induce more consumers to choose to wait until the price discount stage to purchase, resulting in the consumer’s purchasing behavior in the market, which is increasingly strategic. Consumer strategic behavior, means that consumers compare the utility of purchasing in different channels and periods (normal period and discount period) to adjust the timing of purchase according to the expectation of the product’s future price, and wait for the product’s price reduction.In recent years, the influence of strategic consumption behavior on business operation decisions and profitability has attracted a great attention from both academic and practical fields.
This study combines the effects of advertising and price on the purchasing utility of strategic consumers and explore how the omni-channel retailer can develop a two-period (normal and discount period) advertising strategy when addressing strategic consumers. Also, when conducting two-period advertising decisions, how can the retailer make dynamic pricing to gain greater market share and profit?In order to solve the above problems, we introduce consumer strategic behavior into the omni-channel retailing scenario, and construct three advertising decision models of omni-channel two-period advertising and dynamic pricing based on the principle of maximizing consumers’ utility in two periods of different channels, including no placing ads during two periods, place ads during normal period, and place ads during discount period. And we discuss the optimal response mechanism of omni-channel retailer. The model is checked by numerical study.
The results show that: 1)When the consumer’s strategic level is low, the retailer chooses to advertise in the normal period (discount period), with higher price (or lower) for products in the normal period and lower price (or higher) for the products in the discount period. As the consumers’ strategic level increases, the price difference between the two periods gradually decreases.When the consumer’s strategic level is high, the price of the product during the discount period will be higher under the strategy of no ads in the two periods, and the retailer can increase the two-period price adjustment space through advertising; 2)The retailer’s optimal advertising level under the normal advertising strategy is greater than the discount advertising strategy. Compared to no ads, the retailer choosing to advertise in the first stage leads to the highest demand in the normal period and the lowest demand in the discount period. And as the advertising’s influence coefficient increases, the retailer’s advertising in the second stage also makes the normal period demand increase continuously and the discount period demand decrease continuously. This suggests that retailer’s advertising during the normal period or in the discount period is beneficial to the normal period of sales; 3)When the consumer’s strategic level is low or the influence coefficient of advertising is low, the retailer chooses to advertise in the normal period to get the best profit; When the consumer’s strategic level is high and the advertising’s influence coefficient is moderate, it is optimal for retailers to choose to advertise during the discount period; When the consumer’s strategic level and the influence coefficient of advertising are both high, it is the optimal strategy for retailer to choose not to advertise during two periods. The research results provide interesting theoretical suggestions for two-period advertising and dynamic pricing for omni-channel retailer.

Key words: consumer strategy behavior, advertising, dynamic pricing, omni-channel, normal and discount periods

摘要： 在需求为导向的全渠道市场环境下,切实从消费者行为属性制定广告与价格营销策略是促进全渠道零售长足发展的关键。本文将消费者策略行为引入到全渠道零售中,构建零售商在两阶段均不投放广告、第一阶段正常期投放广告及第二阶段优惠期投放广告等三种广告决策模式下全渠道两阶段广告投放与动态定价模型,探讨全渠道零售商的最优响应策略,并对模型进行数值算例。研究发现:当消费者的策略性水平较低时,零售商选择在正常期(优惠期)投放广告策略下,正常期产品定价较高(较低),优惠期产品定价较低(较高);零售商在正常期或优惠期投放广告对正常期销量都是有利的;当消费者的策略性水平较低或广告的影响系数较低时,零售商选择在正常期投放广告能获得最优收益;当消费者的策略性水平偏高、广告的影响系数适中时,零售商在优惠期投放广告是最优的;当消费者的策略性水平及广告的影响系数都偏高时,零售商选择在两阶段均不投放广告是最优策略。

关键词: 消费者策略行为, 广告投放, 动态定价, 全渠道, 正常期和优惠期