Abstract: The competition between the high-speed rail (HSR) and air transportation has been intensified due to the fast development of HSR network in China. During the period of COVID-19 pandemic, passengers chose diversified modes of travelling, such as private cars, as both high-speed rail and air transportation would face unpredictable disruptions due to the regional outbreak of the pandemic. The choice for passengers could be complex, as it was highly affected by the fast-changing situation of the pandemic. Thus, the dynamics for passengers to choose the means of transportation, including HSR, airplane, and private cars ought to be analyzed. By considering passengers, HSR, airlines as three decision makers (DMs), the reasonable strategies for HSR and airlines can be obtained from the equilibrium reached by the three DMs which make their available options from the strategic perspective. In particular, the behavior of passengers is investigated by extracting the public opinions on the internet, so that the preferences of passengers can be elicited with more credibility. The strategies analyzed based on the preferences of passengers can provide reasonable implication for HSR and airlines to survive the dynamic environment of competition in the pandemic era.
The competition between HSR and airlines at the strategic level is studied using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR), a flexible methodology to solve strategic conflicts. As the input of model, the preferences for three DMs, HSR, airlines, and the passengers ought to be elicited. By considering the airlines in the aviation industry, HSR industry, and the passengers with the majority of public opinions, each of the three groups is considered an individual DM. To increase the reliability of the preferences for passengers, we utilize a professional platform, called Zhongyiyuqing, to collect and analyze the public opinion regarding the experience of taking HSR, airplane, and private cars. Public opinion is used for determining the preference statements expressed by the options controlled by the three DMs connected by logical symbols. The equilibria, as the output of the model, are calculated based on the four solution concepts reflecting different patterns of behavior of the DMs, using the existing decision support system called GMCR II. Moreover, the evolution of the conflict from the initial status of the competition, called the status quo, to the equilibria is also studied, so as to reveal the equilibrium situation of the competition in reality. The equilibria at the situation with stricter control of pandemic are also calculated and compared with those at the usual situation. At this situation, the level of pandemic control is reflected by the online opinion of passengers.
The equilibria are calculated at multiple scenarios with different opinions of passengers as well as the level of pandemic control. As suggested by the equilibrium accessed in the evolution analysis, HSR and airlines would choose to compete with each other and refuse to cooperate. Quick actions are recommended: whichever moves first would gain the upper hand. In the medium-range market where fierce competition takes place, airplane would be more preferred by the passengers. When the pandemic control is stricter, HSR and airlines will be suggested to cooperate so as to counter the flow of passengers to private cars. It can also be indicated that safety is the primary concern for passengers.
Both HSR and the aviation industry can be suggested with meaningful strategic implications. First, pandemic control rather than the ticket price might be the prioritized for both HSR and airlines, as passenger might choose private cars for travelling when the pandemic appears regionally. Second, both HSR and airlines should make corresponding market strategies for attracting passengers with an intention of driving. Besides, cooperation between HSR and airlines is wise for both sides to survive the pandemic and achieve a win-win situation, especially when the pandemic control is tightened. This study extends the theoretical framework of the graph model by using online public opinion to describe the preference of passengers in choosing means of public transportation. The results could facilitate the development of business strategies for both HSR and the civil aviation industry in China based on the behavior of passengers.

Key words: pandemic control, graph model for conflict resolution, preference elicitation, public opinion, equilibrium

摘要： 本文在冲突分析图模型理论的基础上,基于网络舆情的视角对疫情防控常态化大环境下高铁与民航竞争冲突问题进行了战略层面的系统研究,研究结果揭示了冲突最终达到均衡的演化机制。首先,运用大数据舆情分析为冲突问题解决需要的关键策略声明提供客观依据,求解得到各决策者博弈的全局均衡解:高铁和民航都选择迅速采取措施先发制人以获取先动优势的策略。其次,通过演化分析直观的展示出空铁冲突达到均衡的演化路径。最后,灵敏度分析结果揭示民航对机票策略由降价到提价的偏好最终会导致客流从民航分别流向高铁和自驾,且流向自驾的倾向性更大;而疫情严重程度增加会促使民航与高铁选择深度合作的策略,协力恢复甚至增强公众使用公共交通方式出行的信心。本研究有助于丰富和拓展大数据情境下冲突分析图模型理论与网络舆情分析在实际中的应用,在战略层面为分析、解决疫情影响下高铁与民航竞争冲突问题提供了决策依据,有利于形成基于旅客市场需求的经营战略。

关键词: 防疫, 冲突分析图模型, 偏好提取, 舆情, 均衡