Abstract: The intertwined interests among online live-streaming platforms, online celebrity anchors, and live-streaming users have gradually brought live-streaming platforms into the field of criminal law by using technical support and other means to provide assistance for crimes. As an important bridge and pillar connecting consumers and Internet celebrities, the behavior of live-streaming platforms concealing and shielding Internet celebrities from selling fake and shoddy products and providing protective umbrellas for criminals will not only cause huge property losses to the public but also seriously threaten the stability of economic development and market order. Therefore, how to effectively prevent this phenomenon has become a practical problem that needs to be solved urgently.
As the primary subject of risk control and primary object of supervision of compliance operations, the online live-streaming platform is the key to controlling the chaos of online live broadcasting. In view of this, based on the dual identities of live-streaming platform managers and perpetrators, the revenue cost from the perspective of crime economics is first analyzed to obtain the influencing factors of online live-streaming platform crime decision-making in this paper. Secondly, a four-way evolutionary game model of online celebrities, live streaming platforms, consumers, and regulatory authorities are constructed, mainly discussing the influencing factors and evolutionary drivers of criminal and management decisions of online platforms. Finally, countermeasures to prevent online live-streaming crimes are proposed. The innovation of this article lies in the fact that: (1)Considering the dual identities of live-streaming platforms. (2)The four-way evolutionary game model is constructed, and the participants in the system are included in the evolutionary game model. (3)Using the theory of crime economics, the cost and benefit analysis of the cost and benefit of the live broadcast platform with the sticky characteristics of the “Internet celebrity economy” is carried out for the first time.
The findings of this paper are as follows. First, as a perpetrator, the criminal decision-making of online live-streaming platforms is jointly affected by factors such as illegal income generated by illegal rent-seeking, operating costs, negative reputation value, crackdown strength of government functional departments, criminal punishment intensity, investment cost and credibility of crime control. Second, as a manager, the strategic choice of an online live-streaming platform is closely related to the quality control of online celebrities with goods, the degree of consumer rights protection, and the strategic choice of strict government supervision. When online celebrities and online live-streaming platforms reach illegal rent-seeking cooperation, consumers’ active rights protection becomes the best strategy. It can be seen that the different strategy choices of online celebrities and live streaming platforms are not the optimal decisions of the two, and the choice of the same strategy is the optimal decision of the two. Due to the large number and scale of Internet celebrities, it is a good idea to firmly grasp the first line of defense of platform supervision and re-transform the platform from the role of perpetrators to the role of regulatory managers.
Considering the influence of the dual identities of live-streaming platform managers and criminals on the subjects of live-streaming systems, this study reveals the strategic selection mechanism of each game subject through the four-way evolutionary game, which provides theoretical thinking for solving the problem of online live-streaming crime in the era of Internet celebrity economy. However, in the period of great development of live broadcasting, the decision-making process of each subject will be dominated by subjective internal emotions. So, in further research, the influence of subjective preference factors of game subjects on system evolution and results will be considered, and multi-period game comparisons will be carried out.

Key words: Internet celebrity economy, live streaming crime, dual roles of platforms, economics of crime, quadrilateral evolutionary game

摘要： 作为控制风险的首要主体和合规运行的首要监督对象,网络直播平台是防治网络直播刑事犯罪的关键。本文基于直播平台管理者和犯罪者的双重身份,运用犯罪经济学理论对网络直播平台进行犯罪经济学分析,同时构建带货网红、直播平台、消费者和监管部门四方演化博弈模型,重点研究网红经济下网络直播平台犯罪决策和管理决策的影响因素及演化动因。研究发现:网络直播平台作为管理者,其策略选择与带货网红品控优劣、消费者维权程度、政府监管严宽密切相关,其中带货网红和直播平台不同向策略选择并非两者最优决策,同向策略选择才是两者最优决策。此外,网络直播平台作为犯罪者,其选择违法的概率与违法寻租收益成正比,与平台负面声誉价值、违法成本、职能部门打击力度、刑罚强度等因素成反比。

关键词: 网红经济, 网络直播犯罪, 平台双重身份, 犯罪经济学, 四方演化博弈