Abstract: The regional energy Internet provides a safe and economic guarantee for the realization of the goal of “30·60”. How to give full play to the role of the government in the initial stage of its construction, coordinate the network operation by using the market mechanism and optimize the allocation of social resources is the key issue for its future development. Facing the emerging development mode of REI market, it is the core of building a market system to clarify the role of the government in each stage of market development and coordinate the relationship between the market and the government. This paper studies the strategic evolution and coordinated development process among stakeholders in the REI market. Taking the energy supply and demand side as a whole, we can simplify the market participants as energy product traders, third-party service providers and energy Internet platforms. The relationship between subjects can be summarized as follows: the supply and demand side of energy products trade multi-energy products through the energy Internet platform, and the third-party service providers provide the services needed in the trading process. The two sides can share information through establishing a cooperation mechanism to obtain excess income, and the government supervises the market behavior of the two partners through the energy Internet platform. Focusing on the problems existing in its market construction, such as imperfect market system and imperfect operation mechanism, this paper constructs a three-party market subject evolution game model among energy product traders, third-party service providers and energy Internet platform, and analyzes the subject equilibrium strategies in different stages of energy Internet market construction in different scenarios.
The findings are as follows: Firstly, in the initial stage of the construction of the REI market, traders and service providers are prone to opportunistic behaviors that harm others and benefit themselves, and market failure requires the government to play a regulatory role through the REI platform; after entering the mature period, the benign cooperation among the subjects can achieve a stable and balanced system without government supervision, and produce positive social external effects; the government can only achieve a stable and balanced market by acting as a “night watchman”. Secondly, when the initial intention of the subject is low, the platform is often needed to play a demonstration role to stimulate the realization of equilibrium; the platform plays a supervisory role through government incentives and penalties, and appropriate government incentives and strong penalties can stimulate balanced realization. Thirdly, the platform can restrain opportunistic behavior in the market and promote the ideal equilibrium of the game system by controlling the hitchhiking income.
The countermeasures and suggestions are as follows: (1)We should give full play to the role of the government in coordinating the interests of the subjects in different stages of the development of the REI market. In the initial stage of the REI market, the government should establish an effective reward and punishment mechanism, improve infrastructure and strive to build an open and interconnected comprehensive energy Internet service platform to provide a flexible and convenient cooperation environment for multi-energy and customized service transactions; after entering the mature period, the government should focus on improving the initial willingness of both partners to participate, ensuring the safe operation of the REI market; after forming a stable cooperative relationship between the main bodies, the government only needs to be a “night watchman”. (2)The government should control the capital investment to reduce the supervision cost and free-rider income as much as possible, and at the same time, introduce a competition mechanism to encourage a large number of distributed entities to participate in market cooperation, and guide them to form a reasonable benefit distribution mechanism to avoid “one family dominates”. (3)Energy product traders and third-party service providers should take the initiative to break down the information barrier and seek a long-term cooperation mechanism to consolidate their interests, so as to avoid unnecessary economic and time losses and achieve a win-win cooperation more quickly. At the same time, relevant enterprises should actively undertake the heavy responsibility of building REI, and strive to be an energy Internet enterprise with China characteristics.

Key words: regional energy Internet, participant interests, government supervision, evolutionary game

摘要： 区域能源互联网将为“双碳”目标的实现提供安全经济的保障,聚焦其市场建设中存在的市场体系不完善、运行机制不健全等问题,构建了能源产品交易者、第三方服务商和能源互联网平台的三方市场主体演化博弈模型,分情景分析了能源互联网市场建设不同阶段的主体均衡策略,初期存在市场失灵需要引入政府监管,待市场机制完善后,政府仅充当“守夜人”即可实现市场的稳定均衡。研究发现:第一,在REI市场建设初期,交易者和服务商容易存在损人利己的机会主义行为,需要政府通过REI平台发挥监管职能;进入成熟期后,主体间的良性合作无需政府监管便可实现系统稳定均衡,并产生社会正外部效应。第二,主体的初始意愿较低时往往需要平台起到示范作用刺激均衡实现;平台通过政府激励和处罚发挥监管职能,适当的政府激励和较强的处罚力度能够刺激均衡实现。第三,平台可以通过控制搭便车收益来抑制市场中的机会主义行为,促进博弈系统实现理想均衡。

关键词: 区域能源互联网, 主体利益, 政府监管, 演化博弈