Abstract: In the relevant research on pricing decision of closed-loop supply chain(CLSC), most of the assumptions are that the game participants are completely rational, whose goal is to maximize the profit, and all decisions remain unchanged with time. However, experimental studies show that when making decisions, what matters most to people is fair treatment, that is, the decision makers will pay attention to the fairness of the profit distribution. Channel reputation and various decision variables change with time, reflecting the dynamic characteristics regarding time change. In this paper, in the CLSC composed of a manufacturer, a retailer and two collectors, the existing research content is extended. It is assumed that the collectors may concentrate on whether the profit distribution between the collectors and the manufacturer is fair, and the strategy space is concern or not concern. The manufacturer may also contemplate the collectors' attention to fair distribution, and the strategy space is consideration or not consideration. When the fairness concern is implanted into the pricing decision of CLSC, the equilibrium solution of CLSC under four strategy combinations is discussed in infinite time zone with the Shapley value as the fairness reference point based on the differential game theory.
What the research shows is that the intense competition will contribute to the reduction of efficiency of the CLSC, so the leader manufacturer makes it a point to control the intensity of the competition in the channel; the recycling effort level changes not only the pricing decisions of reverse channel but also of forward channel; compared with the model where the fairness concern of collectors is “passively” considered, when the manufacture “actively” considers the fairness concern of the collectors, the transfer payment is the smallest, while the collectors pay more recycling effort, providing the best reputation for the CLSC recycling channel. The profits of the manufacturer,the retailer and the collectors have been improved,and more used products are recycled,which is conducive to the sustainable development of the CLSC. The research results help enterprises to understand the influence of fairness preference on economic decision-making.
Distinguishing from the static environment where any strategic combination cannot benefit multiple parties, in the dynamic environment, combination of strategies can do so. Therefore, our research conclusions enrich the existing research results, but this paper neglects the robustness of the equilibrium solution of the CLSC system, and only implants the distribution fairness concern in the pricing decision of the CLSC. The follow-up research will implant multiple fairness concerns of the collectors, and meanwhile explore the robustness of the equilibrium solution of the system.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, fairness concern, reputation, differential game

摘要： 由制造商、零售商和多个回收商组成的闭环供应链中,回收商可能会关注与制造商之间的利润分配是否公平,策略空间为(关注,不关注),制造商也可能会考虑回收商对公平分配的关注,策略空间为(考虑,不考虑)。本文以Shapley值为公平参考点,基于微分博弈理论,在四种策略组合下探讨闭环供应链均衡解。研究表明:激烈的竞争会导致闭环供应链效率降低,渠道领导者制造商有必要控制渠道的竞争强度;回收商的回收努力水平改变逆向渠道定价决策的同时,也改变了正向渠道的定价决策;相较于“被动”考虑回收商的公平关注,制造商“主动”考虑回收商公平关注时回收转移支付最小,而回收商却付出更多的回收努力,从而使得闭环供应链回收渠道声誉最好,制造商、零售商以及回收商的利润都得到了改进,同时回收了更多的废旧产品,有利于闭环供应链的可持续发展。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 公平关注, 声誉, 微分博弈