Abstract: This paper constructs a two-tier supply chain comprised of a single manufacturer and a single e-commerce platform. The manufacturer’s brand products are sold to end consumers through the e-commerce platform using either resale or agency sales model. Consumers in the market have a green sensitivity and higher demand for product quality. The e-commerce platform considers whether to introduce its private label, and whether this private label should be of low or high quality. To this end, the paper examines six different scenarios, provides the specific equilibrium outcomes, and performs a comparative analysis. Additionally, simulations have been conducted using numerical data.
The main findings of the paper are as follows: Firstly, under the reselling model, the introduction of low-quality private labels by e-commerce platforms will be generally feasible only when relative production cost efficiency is low. For high-quality private labels, it is necessary to ensure that the relative production cost efficiency is not too high. Secondly, in the agency model, since manufacturers control pricing and benefit from lower agency rates, introducing private labels could reduce profits for both parties. In such cases, there is a consensus between the e-commerce platform and the manufacturer about not introducing private labels. Additionally, if the production cost efficiency of these brands is low, the e-commerce platform has the flexibility to introduce either high-quality or low-quality brands. In this scenario, private labels have weaker competitiveness and do not pose a threat to manufacturers, thus usually gaining their support and helping to achieve a win-win situation. However, as production cost efficiency increases, if the e-commerce platform’s private labels start to genuinely threaten the manufacturer’s brands, this balance of collaboration might be disrupted. Lastly, when e-commerce platforms introduce low-quality private labels, if these brands are of relatively low quality, they may prompt manufacturers to lower their green levels. If the e-commerce platform enhances the quality of its private labels, manufacturers typically respond by raising their green levels. Yet, when high-quality private labels are introduced and only if these brands reach a certain high-quality threshold, the manufacturer’s green levels might decrease. Moreover, the green levels of manufacturers are higher under the agency model than in the reselling model.
This paper studies the symbiotic and competitive relationship between green manufacturers and e-commerce platforms, offering managerial insights for related businesses. First, the findings can assist manufacturers in adjusting the greenness and pricing of their products in response to the threat posed by retailer private labels. Second, regarding the choice of sales models, after the introduction of private labels, the agency model can facilitate a consensus between the two parties. In the resale model, as the production cost efficiency increases, the platform should consider introducing a high-quality private label. Finally, if the e-commerce platform introduces a private label, it needs to adjust the agency rate and product quality to reach a consensus in the agency model.
While this paper addresses the sales model and the strategy of introducing private labels, it also presents certain limitations. Future studies could explore the following areas: First, this paper presumes that consumers perceive the quality of the manufacturer’s brand and private labels equally, yet some consumers may hold biases against private labels in reality, so future research could account for consumer heterogeneity. Second, the paper only accounts for a manufacturer-centric supply chain structure, though e-commerce platform-centric structures also exist. Third, the paper does not consider the greenness level of products from the e-commerce platform, although several platforms have joined forces with third-party manufacturers to launch green products, such as Amazon with its eco-friendly brand.

Key words: green manufacturer, resale and agency models, private label, relative quality, production cost efficiency

摘要： 电商平台在与绿色制造商开展销售合作的同时,也尝试引入自有品牌以参与市场竞争。引入自有品牌虽为电商平台带来额外的销售收入,但也可能打破与制造商的现有合作关系,并加剧市场产品的竞争。本文基于不同的销售模式及自有品牌策略,构建了制造商与电商平台之间的两阶段博弈模型以深入分析这一现象。研究结果表明:在转售模式中,电商平台引入低质量自有品牌需考虑生产成本效率,而高质量品牌则不宜过高。代理模式下,因制造商控制定价和低代理费,通常不引入自有品牌以保利润。引入生产成本效率低的自有品牌时,电商平台可选择品质的高低,保持和制造商的共赢。但随着生产效率提升,自有品牌可能破坏合作平衡。电商平台的自有品牌质量影响制造商产品的绿色水平:低质品牌促使制造商降低绿色水平,高质量品牌则可能提高或在特定高水平下降低制造商的绿色水平。代理模式下制造商的绿色水平通常高于转售模式。

关键词: 绿色制造商, 转售和代理模式, 自有品牌, 相对质量, 生产成本效率