Abstract: With the increasingly prominent environmental problems, electric vehicles (EV) have become more and more popular around the world. Using the selling price of EV as the subsidy threshold has become a key criterion for governments to formulate incentive subsidy policies and change the existing competitive landscape of the EV market, potentially leading to intense price wars. Therefore, the urgent research question to be solved is: should EV manufacturers restricted by the price threshold subsidy adjust their prices to obtain subsidies? In addition, given battery recycling and innovation as the two main features influencing manufacturers’ pricing decisions, will subsidy policies force EV manufacturers to increase their innovation efforts and recycling rates?
This study provides an in-depth exploration of the competitive landscape between high-technology EV manufacturers and low-technology EV manufacturers in the market based on the price-threshold subsidy policy context, exploring three main questions: Firstly, it investigates how price threshold subsidy policy influences the optimal pricing strategies of EV manufacturers in a competitive landscape characterized by technological differentiation. Secondly, it delves into the impact of price threshold subsidy policy on the operational decisions of EV manufacturers, including pricing, recycling, and innovation under the three pricing strategies, and aims to uncover optimal pricing strategies for EV manufacturers. Thirdly, it explores how governments set a reasonable policy for price threshold and subsidy level.
Based on the above background, this study develops four pricing models. Firstly, we consider the pricing strategy in the absence of subsidies, serving as the benchmark model in this paper, denoted as Model N. Then, we consider the existence of price threshold subsidy policy. We examine a scenario where the government sets the price threshold between the two product prices, with high-quality products restricted by the price threshold while low-quality products are not subject to this threshold. Therefore, the low-tech manufacturer is the policy beneficiary, and the high-tech manufacturer is a policy restricted manufacturer. The three pricing strategies under the price threshold subsidy policy are: Model C-price retention strategy: it is assumed that the restricted manufacturer adopts a price retention strategy in response to the price threshold subsidy policy. Model D-pricing war strategy oriented towards market competition: to counter the competitive advantage of policy beneficiary, the restricted manufacturer considers participating in market competition by adjusting prices, but its pricing remains above the price threshold. Model J-pricing war strategy oriented towards subsidy acquisition: the policy-restricted manufacturer reduces the price to match the price threshold subsidy, allowing both EV manufacturers to qualify for the government subsidy. Finally, the Nash equilibrium solution of each model is obtained by using the backward induction.
Through the comparative analysis of equilibrium results, we find that, the restricted manufacturer can employ a combination of price war strategy and product innovation strategy to enhance its market competitiveness. Specifically, the restricted manufacturer should choose to implement a price retention strategy when both the price threshold and subsidy level are relatively low. Conversely, when the subsidy level is relatively high or the price threshold is relatively high, the restricted manufacturer can flexibly adopt price war strategies oriented towards market competition or subsidy acquisition to mitigate profit losses. When the subsidy level is relatively low, the policy beneficiary can also benefit from the pricing strategy adopted by the restricted manufacturer, achieving a win-win situation. In summary, the results drawn in this study not only contribute to further enriching the field of EV supply chain operational management but also serve as a reference for EV manufacturers when formulating decisions for pricing, product innovation, and product recycling in the context of price threshold subsidy policy. Additionally, it provides theoretical support for governments to formulate scientifically reasonable subsidy policies.

Key words: price threshold subsidy, product pricing, power battery recycling, product innovation, closed-loop supply chain

摘要： 基于政府设置补贴门槛政策背景,构建存在技术差异的电动汽车制造商双寡头竞争模型,其中低技术制造商是政策受益者,高技术制造商是被政策限制者,同时考虑电池研发和回收两个重要特征,探究制造商应对补贴门槛政策的最优定价策略和研发策略。研究表明,较高的补贴水平和补贴门槛阈值会促使政策受益者降低产品回收率。被政策限制者应该在补贴门槛阈值较低且补贴水平也较低时采取价格保持策略,在补贴水平相对高或者补贴门槛阈值较高时灵活性地采取以市场竞争为导向或以获取补贴为导向的价格战策略。较高的补贴门槛阈值会促使被政策限制者在其价格战策略下提高产品研发水平。当补贴水平较低时,政策受益者也可以从被政策限制者采取的价格策略中获益,实现双赢。

关键词: 补贴门槛, 产品定价, 动力电池回收, 产品研发, 闭环供应链