Abstract: In order to solve logistics service integrator’s capacity sourcing and service provider’ s investment coordination problem with demand and supply uncertainties, we analyze logistics service integrator and service provider’ s strategies model under Stackelberg leader-follower game, and give a sourcing expenses reimbursement based on revenue sharing contract. The optimal contract parameter and intervals that can realize supply chain coordination and Pareto improvement are illustrated. A numerical example is further given to confirm the effectiveness of the contract and the effects of supply and demand volatility on the decision-maker strategy. The results show that the logistics service integrator can effectively coordinate investment and sourcing risk by adjusting contract parameter in terms of supply and demand volatility.

Key words: supply chain management, supply uncertainty, contract coordination, logistics service integrator

摘要： 为解决物流能力供应和需求不确定环境下,物流服务集成商和供应商能力采购和投资的协调问题,建立了Stackelberg主从博弈下物流服务集成商和供应商的决策模型,提出了基于收益共享的能力采购费用补偿协调机制,给出了实现供应链协同以及帕雷托改进的合约参数设计和取值区间。数值分析进一步验证了该协调机制的有效性,以及供应和需求波动对决策双方行为的影响。研究结果表明,物流服务集成商通过调节合约参数取值能有效协调供应和需求随机环境下物流服务供应链的采购和投资风险。

关键词: 供应链管理, 供应不确定, 契约协调, 物流服务集成商