Abstract: The paper studies that how the fairness preferences affect trade credit and pricing strategy of supply chain considering the fairness preference. First, we build the decision models in three cases: the supplier with fairness preference, the retailer with fairness preference and both with the fairness preference. The paper analyses the optimal trade credit period of the supplier and the optimal retail price of the retailers adopting the Stackelberg game. The study finds that when the retailer has the fairness preference, the retail price of retailer does not change with the degree of fairness preference; when the retailer have greater fairness preference, the credit term that supplier can provide is longer. In the case of only supplier having fairness preference, when the supplier have greater fairness preference, the retail price of retailer is lower, and the trade credit term that supplier can provide is shorter; in the case of both the sides have fairness preferences, the retail price is increasing with the preferences; the trade credit term that the supplier can provide is increasing with the preference coefficient of himself and is decreasing function on the preference coefficient of the retailers. The utility functions for the supply chain members is increasing with its preference, and decreasing with the other’s preference coefficient; with both sides having fairness preference, the supply chain profit is less than the supply chain profit with no fairness preference.

Key words: supply chain management, pricing, trade credit, Stackelberg game, fairness preference

摘要： 论文将公平偏好引入商业信用供应链的运作中,研究公平偏好如何影响供应链的商业信用和定价策略。论文在三种情况下,即仅供应商关注公平,仅零售商关注公平和双方均关注公平,运用Stackelberg博弈分析了供应商的最优商业信用期及零售商的最优零售价格。研究发现,当零售商具有公平偏好时,零售价格与其公平偏好程度无关;零售商的公平偏好程度越大,供应商提供的商业信用期限越长。当仅供应商具有公平偏好时,供应商的公平偏好程度越大,零售商的零售价格越大,供应商提供的商业信用期限越短;当双方都具有公平偏好时,零售商的零售价格关于双方偏好均为增函数;供应商的商业信用期限为自身偏好系数的增函数,为零售商偏好系数的减函数。供应链成员的效用为自身偏好系数的增函数,对方偏好系数的减函数;双方具有公平偏好时,供应链利润小于无公平偏好时的供应链利润。

关键词: 供应链管理, 定价, 商业信用, Stackelberg博弈, 公平偏好