Abstract: In Stackelberg pricing decision for payment of cash on delivery in dyadic supply chain, it is a non-negligible factor that the supply chain firms deposit for the idle fund but apply for loan when finance is constrained, and how to construct Stackelberg pricing decision model is an important problem which needs to be paid attention to in dyadic supply chain considering the deposit and loan of bank based on the payment of cash on delivery. In this paper, first, the market demand function is given. Then, for the two common situations in which the manufacturer or the retailer is finance constrained, the pricing decision models for different supply chain power structures are constructed based on the payment of cash on delivery. Furthermore, the optimal policies can be determined for two power structures in two situations, and the impacts of model parameters on optimal policies are analyzed. Finally, the comparison analysis of optimal polices and the impacts of bank rates on the optimal policies and profits are conducted for different finance-constrained situations and supply chain power structures. The research results show that three bank rates can affect the optimal policies, and the impact of the difference of finance-constrained objectives is more obvious.

Key words: pricing, payment of cash on delivery, finance constrain, deposit and loan of bank, Stackelberg game

摘要： 在货到付款支付模式下二级供应链定价决策中,供应链企业资金闲置时向银行存款或资金约束时向银行贷款(银行存贷)的行为是不可忽视的重要因素,如何构建基于货到付款支付模式且考虑银行存贷的二级供应链Stackelberg定价决策模型是需要关注的重要问题。在本文中,首先给出了市场需求函数;然后,基于货到付款支付模式,针对制造商资金或零售商资金约束情形,分别构建针对不同供应链权力结构的定价决策模型;进一步地,通过模型求解确定了不同情形下不同权力结构的制造商与零售商的最优策略,并分析了模型参数对最优策略的影响;最后,针对不同资金约束情形与不同权力结构的最优策略以及银行利率对最优策略及利润影响,给出了对比分析。研究表明三种银行利率均会影响最优策略,且资金约束对象差异的影响明显。

关键词: 定价, 货到付款支付模式, 资金约束, 银行存贷, Stackelberg博弈