Abstract: The applications of RFID not only effectively reduce the inventory loss rate but also inevitably lead to greater operational costs of the supply-chain enterprises, especially the medium and small sized enterprises with limited capital. We consider a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer to depict the influence of RFID application. The retailer may borrow the manufacturer's credit to fund its business. To reduce inventory loss, both members plan to employ RFID. With a wholesale price contract, we construct Stackelberg game models with trade credit financing for two kinds of RFID application timing. We characterize the conditions under which both members prefer to adopt RFID. We find that when RFID's tag cost is lower or when the inventory loss recovery rate of RFID is higher than a certain threshold, both members prefer to employ RFID. We also find that when RFID's tag cost or tag cost-sharing coefficient is relatively low or when the inventory loss recovery rate of RFID is relatively high, the manufacturer tends to set a higher wholesale price than that without RFID application. The retailer correspondingly orders less quantity. Through designing a revenue sharing contract, the coordination of the supply chain with RFID application is achieved.

Key words: RFID, capital-constrained retailer, trade credit financing, Stackelberg game, revenue sharing contract

摘要： RFID技术的应用在有效降低商品库存损耗率的同时,也增加了供应链企业的运营成本,尤其是具有资金压力的供应链中小企业。在零售商具有资金约束的二级供应链下分析RFID技术的应用对资金约束供应链绩效的影响,通过构建贸易信贷下基于批发价合同的Stackelberg博弈模型,对比采用RFID前后资金约束供应链成员的均衡决策及期望收益,探讨了该供应链采用RFID的必要条件。结果显示当RFID标签成本低于某个阈值,或RFID库存损耗恢复率高于某个阈值时,供应链成员会选择采用RFID。此外,当RFID单位标签成本或零售商标签成本分摊系数较低,或RFID库存损耗恢复率较高时,制造商会提供比不采用RFID时更高的批发价;在采用RFID的条件下,零售商订购数量低于不采用RFID时的数量。通过设计收益分享契约实现了采用RFID时资金约束供应链的协调。

关键词: RFID, 资金约束零售商, 贸易信贷, Stackelberg博弈, 收益分享契约