Pricing, Service Decision and Recycling Mode of E-Closed-Loop Supply Chain Dominated by E-commerce Platform

doi:10.12005/orms.2021.0383

Abstract

Abstract: The E-closed-loop supply chain (E-CLSC) management should be supported by scientific pricing and service decision. Aimed at the centralized and decentralized recycling modes, the Stackelberg game model of E-CLSC dominated by e-commerce platform is constructed, and the pricing and platform service decision problems of E-CLSC system are studied. Through the analysis of equilibrium strategies such as product sales price and platform service level, this paper reveals the influence of investment effectiveness of the recovery subject and transfer price on E-CLSC equilibrium strategy. The research shows that: centralized recovery mode is better than decentralized recovery mode. In the decentralized recovery mode, if the investment effectiveness of the recovery subject is the same, both the manufacturer and the platform prefer the manufacturer recovery mode. Compared with the third-party recycling model, the sales price and service level of the platform are the same, but the former recycling channel is more efficient. In addition, under the platform recovery mode, unit commission is negatively correlated with recovery transfer price, while product sales price, platform service level and waste product recovery rate have nothing to do with recovery transfer price. If the investment efficiency of the recovery subject varies greatly, the manufacturer's recovery mode is not always optimal, because the difference in investment effectiveness of recycling subjects significantly affects product sales price, recycling channel efficiency, platform service level and E-CLSC member profits. Finally, the validity of the above conclusion is verified by numerical simulation.

Key words: dominant platform, e-closed-loop supply chain, Stackelberg game, pricing and service decision, effectiveness of recovery agent investment

摘要： E-闭环供应链(E-CLSC)管理须有科学的定价与服务决策支撑。针对集中和分散回收模式,构建电商平台主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究E-CLSC定价与平台服务决策。通过对产品销售价格、平台服务水平等均衡策略分析,揭示回收主体投资有效性、回收转移价格等对E-CLSC均衡策略影响。研究表明:集中回收模式优于分散回收模式;在分散回收模式下,若回收主体投资有效性相同,制造商、平台均偏好制造商回收模式;平台回收与第三方回收模式相比,产品销售价格、平台服务水平相同,前者回收渠道效率较高;平台回收模式下,单位佣金与回收转移价格负相关,产品销售价格、平台服务水平、废旧产品回收率均与回收转移价格无关;若回收主体投资有效性差异程度较大,制造商回收模式并非总是最优的,回收主体投资有效性差异显著影响产品销售价格、回收渠道效率、平台服务水平和E-CLSC各成员利润。上述结论通过数值仿真进行了验证。

关键词: 平台主导, E-闭环供应链, Stackelberg博弈, 定价与服务决策, 回收主体投资有效性

CLC Number:

F224.3

LIU Kai, LI Chun-fa, LI Dong-dong. Pricing, Service Decision and Recycling Mode of E-Closed-Loop Supply Chain Dominated by E-commerce Platform[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(12): 51-57.

刘凯, 李春发, 李冬冬. 电商平台主导的E-闭环供应链定价、服务决策与回收模式[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(12): 51-57.

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