Abstract: Under the carbon cap-and-trade mechanism, this paper studies a supply chain optimization problem with a capital constrained retailer. A Stackelberg game model between one dominant manufacturer and one retailer is established and the cost-sharing contract for emission reduction is introduced to the model. Then the optimal solutions of decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making are obtained. Revenue sharing contract is also introduced between the members to achieve supply chain coordination and the Pareto improvement of members' profits. A numerical example is conducted to analyze the impacts of the cost-sharing coefficient and carbon price on profit of the supply chain, as well as the decision-making of order quantity and carbon emission reductions. The results show that the cooperation of members can lead to a better supply chain performance and more and greener products for consumers. The increase of carbon price promotes the supply chain to reduce emissions sharply, thereby increasing total profit of the supply chain.

Key words: low carbon supply chain, capital constraints, cap-and-trade, stackelberg game, revenue sharing contract

摘要： 在碳限额与交易机制下,研究零售商受资金约束的供应链优化问题。构建了制造商占优的两级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,通过引入减排成本分担机制,分别给出了分散决策和集中决策的最优解。通过收益共享契约,实现了供应链协调和供应链成员利润的帕累托改善。通过算例分析了不同减排成本分担系数、碳交易价格对供应链利润和订购量、碳减排决策的影响,为供应链各成员开展减排合作提供了理论依据。研究结果表明,供应链成员的合作不仅可以提高供应链总绩效,而且有利于为消费者提供更多、更绿色的产品;碳价格的提高,促使供应链更加努力减排,从而提高了供应链总利润。

关键词: 低碳供应链, 资金约束, 碳限额与交易机制, Stackelberg博弈, 收益共享契约