Licensing Strategy of Innovation with the Participation of Patent Intermediaries

doi:10.12005/orms.2021.0090

Abstract

Abstract: With the development of innovative technologies, the roles of patent intermediaries (PIs) have gained more and more attention. The innovations provided by external innovators are sold in an auction to the highest bidder among the firms and the PI. In this study, it is considered that an external innovator auctions a quality-improving innovation to two manufacturing enterprises and the PI. Then the innovation will be licensed by the winner. We analyze the production decisions of the two enterprises and the influence of the PI on the market based on Stackelberg game model. The degree of innovation is divided into three types, i.e., incremental, moderate and radical innovation. It is obtained that: 1)The following enterprise cannot win the innovation directly in the bidding; 2)If the leading enterprise wins the innovation, it will license the innovation to the following enterprise under the incremental innovation, and if the IP wins the innovation, it will license the innovation to the leading enterprise under the radical innovation; 3)The PI will increase the profit of the external innovator and reduce the profit of leading enterprise.

Key words: patent intermediary, quality innovation, patent licensing, Stackelberg game

摘要： 考虑外部创新者向两个制造企业及专利中介(PI)拍卖提高质量的创新技术, 获胜者可对创新技术进行授权。基于Stackelberg博弈模型分析两企业的生产决策, 以及PI对市场的影响。研究发现:1)跟随企业在竞价中无法直接赢得专利; 2)若赢得专利, 领导企业只有在渐进式创新中授权给跟随企业, 而PI仅在根本性创新中授权给领导企业; 3)PI的存在会增加外部创新者的利润而降低领导企业的利润。

关键词: 专利中介, 质量创新, 技术授权, Stackelberg博弈

CLC Number:

F270.5

FENG Lin, PENG Ya-zhi, NIE Jia-jia. Licensing Strategy of Innovation with the Participation of Patent Intermediaries[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(3): 159-164.

冯琳, 彭娅芝, 聂佳佳. 专利中介参与下的技术创新授权策略[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(3): 159-164.

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