Carbon Emission Reduction Technology Investment Decision Based on Two-SidedMatching-Dynamic Game

doi:10.12005/orms.2020.0196

Abstract

Abstract: Under the Cap-and-Trade system, this paper studies an investment decision-making problem of carbon emission reduction technology(CERT)of duopoly manufacturers(oligo-manufacturer)based on matching-game mechanism, CET is considered. From the vertical perspective, a two-sided matching model between oligo-manufacturers and suppliers who provide heterogeneous CERTs is constructed, realizing the optimal CERT selection for oligo-manufacturers and the best investor selection for suppliers. From the viewpoint of horizontal, a dynamic Stackelberg game model is established, in which the production quantity is regarded as the decision variable, the effort level of the technical research and development(R&D)personnel of the suppliers as the auxiliary variable. We obtain the optimal joint production quantity, CERT investment and carbon emissions decision-makings. Finally, we offer some numerical simulation experiments to demonstrate the above arguments and find that, firstly, the total expected utilities of oligo-manufacturer and supplier matching pairs have positive linear relationship with CET price. Secondly, the environmental performance of oligo-manufacturers is more sensitive to the effectiveness of their own CERT applications than the effectiveness of rival. Lastly, compared with no CET, CET will create more utilities for the oligo-manufacturer and supplier matching pair.

Key words: Cap-and-Trade, duopoly, carbon emission reduction technology investment, two-sided matching, Stackelberg game

摘要： 在Cap-and-Trade规制下,本文通过匹配-博弈机制研究双寡头制造商(寡头)碳减排技术投资决策问题,考虑了碳交易(CET)过程。从纵向角度,构建寡头与碳减排技术供应商(供应商)的双边匹配模型,研究寡头最佳碳减排技术选择、供应商最佳投资者选择问题;从横向角度,以产量为决策变量,以供应商技术研发人员的努力程度为辅助变量,构建双寡头Stackelberg动态博弈模型,以确定最优产量和碳减排技术投资决策,有效实现碳减排。最后,通过数值模拟实验加以论证。研究发现,第一,寡头-供应商匹配对的整体期望效用与CET价格存在正相关关系;第二,寡头环境绩效对自身技术应用效率较敏感,而对对手技术应用效率不敏感;第三,CET实施与否会直接影响寡头-供应商匹配对效用最大化目标的实现。

关键词: Cap-and-Trade, 双寡头, 碳减排技术投资, 双边匹配, Stackelberg博弈

CLC Number:

F272.3

LIU Li, ZHANG Zai-sheng, WANG Zhe. Carbon Emission Reduction Technology Investment Decision Based on Two-SidedMatching-Dynamic Game[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2020, 29(8): 20-26.

刘丽, 张再生, 王哲. 基于双边匹配-动态博弈的碳减排技术投资决策[J]. 运筹与管理, 2020, 29(8): 20-26.

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