Game Analysis for Pricing Strategies in O2O Logistic Service Supply Chain with Fairness Concern

doi:10.12005/orms.2021.0283

Abstract

Abstract: In order to provide theoretical basis for the practice and development of logistics service supply chain under O2O mode,this paper focuses on a logistics service supply chain under the O2O model consisting of two functional logistics service providers (FLSP) and a single logistics service integrator self-operated online logistics platform (LSIO), that is, considering the logistics service integrator (LSI) operate online logistics platform on itself, fairness concern is introduced into the pricing decisions of logistics service supply chain under O2O model, the impact of fairness concern of functional logistics service provider (FLSP) on the pricing strategies and utility of supply chain members is analyzed, and practical management enlightenment for the development of logistics service supply chain under O2O model is provided. The conclusions show that in the two cases of considering only horizontal fairness concerns and considering bidirectional fairness concerns, the post-entry logistics service provider (FLSP2) should both control its horizontal fairness concerns, otherwise it will damage the utility of the logistics service supply chain under the O2O model. In the case of considering bidirectional fairness concern, while the first-entry logistics service provider (FLSP1) finds that the amount of logistics service orders allocated to itself decrease, FLSP1 have a vertical injustice aversion of LSIO, and after that FLSP1's vertical fairness concerns reach a certain level , LSIO should begin to consider the vertical fairness of FLSP1 and avoid the loss of the FLSP.

Key words: O2O, fairness concern, logistic service supply chain, Stackelberg game

摘要： 针对两个物流服务提供商(FLSP)和单个物流服务集成商自营的线上物流平台(LSIO)组成的两层O2O模式下物流服务供应链,即考虑物流服务集成商(LSI)自营线上物流平台的情形,将公平关切引入到O2O模式下物流服务供应链的定价决策中,基于Stackelberg博弈模型,研究物流服务提供商(FLSP)的公平关切有限理性行为对物流服务供应链成员定价策略和效用的影响。研究结论表明:在仅考虑横向公平关切和考虑双向公平关切这两种情形下,后进入市场的物流服务提供商(FLSP2)都应控制自己的横向公平关切行为,否则会影响O2O模式下物流服务供应链的发展;在考虑双向公平关切的情形下,先进入市场的物流服务提供商(FLSP1)发现分配给自己的物流服务订单量减少后,FLSP1会对LSIO产生纵向不公平厌恶,而FLSP1的纵向公平关切程度达到一定水平后,物流服务集成商自营的线上物流平台(LSIO)应重视 FLSP1的纵向公平关切,避免物流服务提供商流失。

关键词: O2O模式, 公平关切, 物流服务供应链, Stackelberg博弈

CLC Number:

C939

TAN Chun-qiao, WU Xin, ZHOU Li. Game Analysis for Pricing Strategies in O2O Logistic Service Supply Chain with Fairness Concern[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2021, 30(9): 80-85.

谭春桥, 吴欣, 周丽. 考虑公平关切的O2O模式下物流服务供应链定价策略博弈分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2021, 30(9): 80-85.

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