Abstract: This article analyzes the influence of O2O sales strategy of uniform price online and offline adopted by retailers on the operations and profits of all the supply chain members from the perspective of chain-to-chain competition. The chain-to-chain competition Stackelberg game models are established based on two different competition modes and the equilibrium profit results are obtained. The results show that when the unit walking-cost is greater than a certain threshold with respect to the electronic channel perception coefficient, the rational retailer will adopt the O2O strategy to increase the profits. It is more important that the retailer's strategy will also increase the profits of the manufacturers both in their supply chain and competitive supply chain. And what is more, when the unit walking-cost with respect to the electronic channel perception coefficient further increases to a bigger threshold, all members in both supply chain will get the benefits. But the O2O sales strategy will raise the sale prices and decrease the consumer surplus.

Key words: chain to chain, uniform price online and offline, sales strategy, retailers

摘要： 本文从链与链竞争的角度分析了零售商采用线上线下同价的O2O销售策略对所在供应链成员及竞争供应链成员运营和利润的影响。依据两种竞争模式建立链与链竞争的Stackelberg博弈模型,并得到了博弈均衡解。研究结果表明,当单位赶路成本相对电子渠道感知系数大于一定阈值时,理性的零售商将采用线上线下同价的O2O销售策略来增加自身利润。更重要的发现是,此时零售商所在供应链和竞争供应链上的制造商利润也会随之增加,而且当单位赶路成本相对电子渠道感知系数继续增大到另一阈值时,两条链上的所有成员均将受益。但线上线下同价的O2O销售策略会抬高售价,降低消费者剩余。

关键词: 链与链, 线上线下同价, 销售策略, 零售商