Abstract: The willingness to pay low carbon products of consumers and the government environmental policies drive enterprises to examine their low-carbon production decisions. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the behavior of low carbon production of enterprise groups under the situation of market autonomy and government involvement in low carbon certification by incorporating the factors that affect enterprises’ decision-making on low carbon production into the game framework of bounded rationality. The results show that the low carbon productiondecisions of enterprises are influenced by the low carbon income and fair utility. In the initial stage of the market, low carbon costs are relatively high, and there are few rational consumers with low carbon knowledge. The asymmetry of low carbon information between enterprises and consumers leads to the failure of enterprises to obtain appropriate low carbon premium income. In a completely autonomous market, it is difficult for enterprises to take the initiative in low carbon production only by their own decisions. Low carbon certification can accelerate the benign transformation of the market to enterprises’ low carbon production when the market reaches a certain proportion of products with low carbon certification.

Key words: low carbon premium, bounded rationality, fairness preference, low carboncertification, evolutionary game

摘要： 消费者愿意为产品支付低碳溢价的低碳消费趋势及政府环境政策驱动企业审视自身的低碳生产决策问题。通过将影响企业低碳生产决策的因素纳入有限理性的博弈框架,分析市场自治与政府介入低碳认证情形下企业群体低碳生产行为。结果表明,企业低碳生产决策受低碳收益及公平效用影响;市场初始阶段,低碳成本较高,具备低碳知识的理性消费者较少,企业与消费者关于低碳信息的不对称导致企业不能获得合适的低碳溢价收益,在完全自治的市场情形下,仅靠企业自身决策很难达到主动进行低碳生产的良性状态;低碳认证作为政府介入手段,当市场中低碳认证的产品达到一定比例,能够加速推动市场向企业进行低碳生产的良性状态转化。

关键词: 低碳溢价, 有限理性, 公平偏好, 低碳认证, 演化博弈