Abstract: In the supply chains with process innovation or product innovation, when the demand forecasting information is asymmetric, this paper studies the retailer's demand information sharing strategy and the manufacturer's optimal innovation mode. Using refined Bayesian theory and Stackelberg game models, this paper firstly derives the value of information sharing of each mode, and then investigates an incentive mechanism that induces the retailer to share demand information and equilibrium information sharing strategies. Secondly, this paper compares the profits under the two kinds of innovation model. The research shows that in both models, when innovation efficiency is high and low, retailers' voluntary sharing and non-sharing of demand information are respectively equilibrium strategies. When innovation efficiency is in the middle level, a bargaining mechanism can be designed to enable retailers to share demand information. In addition, when consumers are more sensitive to products' quality (price), manufacturers can benefit all members of the supply chain by choosing the product innovation (process innovation) model.

Key words: process innovation, product innovation, information sharing, bargaining mechanism

摘要： 在制造商进行流程创新和产品创新的供应链中,当需求预测信息不对称时,研究了零售商的需求信息分享策略以及制造商最优创新模式。利用精炼贝叶斯理论和Stackelberg博弈模型,首先求得了每一种创新模式下信息分享价值、促进需求信息分享的激励机制以及供应链均衡的信息分享策略,其次对两种创新模式下利润进行对比分析。研究发现,在两种创新供应链模型中,当创新效率较高和较低时,零售商自愿分享和不分享需求信息分别是均衡策略;当创新效率处于中间水平时,通过设计一个讨价还价机制可以使零售商分享需求信息成为一个均衡。此外,当消费者对质量(价格)更敏感时,制造商选择产品创新(流程创新)模式可以使供应链成员都获益。

关键词: 流程创新, 产品创新, 信息分享, 讨价还价机制